Foreign Relations

One of four agreements Israel signed in 1949 with Arab neighbors, it does not end “state of war,” between Israel and Arab states. No treaty is signed until 1979.

Nasser asserts that the conflict with Israel is not over access to the Gulf of Aqaba but the very existence of Israel; Egypt’s foes are Britain and the US that support Israel.

Spring/Summer 1997 Kenneth W. Stein, “Continuity and Change in Egyptian-Israeli Relations, 1973-97,” Israel Affairs, Spring/Summer 1997, Vol. 3, Nos. 3 and 4, pp. 296-320 For 25 years, tension, mistrust, and strain have characterized Egyptian-Israeli relations....

Ken Stein explains in detail how Egyptian and Israeli leaders coached their generals into reaching an understanding on how their troops would be disengaged after the war. On that day, a German-born Egyptian career foreign service officer, Omar Sirry was told to pack his toothbrush and go to meet several Israelis along with other Egyptians at the 101 Kilometer marker for talks.

Sadat tells the Israeli people and world that he seeks a just and durable peace, which is not a separate peace, between Israel and Egypt. He equates statehood for the Palestinians as their right to return.

Begin welcomes Sadat’s bold initiative, seeking an end to the conflict with other Arab states through negotiated treaties. Begin invites other Arab leaders to negotiate as Sadat was doing.

Signed sixteen months after Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem, it calls for establishment of diplomatic relations, staged Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, and American security arrangements to support the bilateral treaty.

By Ken Stein, October 28, 2024 When Georgia Governor Jimmy Carter became the 39th President of the United States in 1977, he had little foreign policy experience, particularly regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict. Despite this, he...

Historical Background Unlike any other region of the world, Europe has had the most intimate, impactful and longest-lasting relationship with contemporary Israel and its origins. As the birthplace of Judaism and Christianity and with the...

Books Abadi, Jacob. British Withdrawal From the Middle East: The Economic and Strategic Imperatives. Princeton, NJ: Kingston Press, 1982. Ahiram, Ephraim, and Alfred Tovias (eds.). Whither EU-Israel Relations? Common and Divergent Interest. Frankfurt: Lang, 1995....

The Sharif of Mecca and Sir Henry McMahon, a British official in Cairo, speaking for the Foreign Office exchanged letters about the current war effort against the Turks, and the future political status of specific Arab lands in the Ottoman Empire. McMahon said then and he repeated the statement again in 1937, that the area of Palestine was definitely excluded from any area to be provided to an Arab leader after WWI. The British allowed the area of Palestine to develop as a "national home for the Jewish people."

Pressure from Arab leaders in states surrounding Palestine, growing instability in the eastern Mediterranean, and a firm opposition voiced by the British High Commissioner in Egypt, Miles Lampson, caused the British to withdraw the idea of resolving the Arab-Zionist conflict with a two-state solution. Instead, heavy restrictions were imposed in 1939 on the growth of the Jewish National home. Coincidently this policy statement is issued, two days after Nazi Germany attacks Jewish, homes, businesses and synagogues, in what came to be known as Kristallnacht.

Over four decades, Winston Churchill’s views on Zionism and Jews varied greatly. Without knowing his long held personal beliefs or the policies he adopted while the Jewish state developed, and only reading this speech, one would not know that he was a political opportunist and certainly not a “Gentile Zionist.”

The UN recommended establishing Arab and Jewish states in Palestine, with an international regime for Jerusalem. Zionists were jubilant; Arab states and the Palestinians were indignant and rejected two state solution. No Arab state is established, Israel is in 1948

Fearing Communist penetration of the Eastern Mediterranean, Truman at the beginning of the Cold War defines the region as a sphere of US national interest.

Upon admission to the U.N., Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett said, "It was the consummation of a people's transition from political anonymity to clear identity, from inferiority to equal status, from mere passive protest to active responsibility, from exclusion to membership in the family of nations."

This report submitted to the United Nations at the end of 1951 notes that “some one million Jews have become the victims of accelerated antiSemitism” since 1948 in the Muslim countries of the Arab League and North Africa, “communities which have existed for thousands of years.” The report analyzes the situation for Jews overall and explains restrictions and oppressive measures country by country.

Further reinforcing the Truman Doctrine, the US President promises military or economic aid to any Middle Eastern country resisting Communist aggression.

Naively, the Carter Administration believes that a conference with the USSR would start comprehensive negotiations; instead, the fear of Moscow’s engagement helps drive direct Egyptian-Israeli talks.

In Aprili 1987, the Jordanian King and Israeli Labor Party leaders secretly outlined a plan to convene an international conference to move Israeli-Palestinian talks forward through a conference format, but Likud opposition leaders in Israel squashed the idea.

Negotiated through the Norwegians, the Accords call for limited Palestinian rule in some of the territories; it did not call for a Palestinian state or an end to settlements.

European Parliament calls for recognition of Palestinian statehood in the context for a negotiated two-state solution for Palestinians and Israelis; it outlines the political and geographic contours for a negotiated outcome.

How has Israel through its 75 years managed its relationships with superpowers, neighbors and other countries while trying to survive and thrive in an often hostile neighborhood? Why is the U.S. relationship essential? What is...

Until the 1990s, when Israel’s increased engagement with Asia notably expanded, her relations with China, India and Japan were limited for three broad reasons.

Odds are that China and Russia will prove to be long-term US rivals. However, it may just as well be that their alliance will prove to be more tactical than strategic, with the China-Russia relationship resembling US-Chinese ties: cooperation in an environment of divergence rather than convergence.

May 18, 2025 Contradiction has been a theme in Iran’s relationship with the Jewish people, for nowhere else in the Muslim world have Jews both suffered so grievously and flourished so thoroughly. Nor is the...

October 4, 2024 Source: https://english.khamenei.ir/news/11146/Palestinian-and-Lebanese-Resistance-pushed-back-Zionist-regime Iranian leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s speech is a synopsis of Iran’s hatred of Israel and the United States and the need to rid the region of foreigners. Khamenei provides deep insights into...

Iran’s relations with Israel and the Jewish people from ancient times to the present day. June 23-June 24, 2025 — At the request of President Donald Trump, Iran and Israel enter a cease-fire to end...

Hamas leader, Ismail Haniyeh says, "we shall never recognize the "usurper Zionism government"...continue Jihadist movement until liberation of Jerusalem."

Compiled by Aidan New Iran lies behind much of what Israel has battled since Hamas launched its brutal terrorist attack Oct. 7, 2023. By theology and ideology, Iran is committed to Israel’s destruction. By policy...

Hamas’ terrorist assault Oct. 7, killing 1,200 and kidnapping more than 240, was the worst slaughter of Jews since the Holocaust, but the night of April 13-14 could have been worse when Iran attacked Israel...

Hezbollah has used its stronghold in southern Lebanon to launch continual attacks on northern Israel since October 8, 2023. Hezbollah says it is motivated by its support for Hamas, a fellow member of Iran’s Axis of Resistance surrounding Israel. While Hezbollah is Shia and Hamas is Sunni, both are devoted to Israel’s destruction, and both receive funding from and coordinate with Iran.

May 13, 2025 President Donald Trump’s address laying out a vision for Middle East peace and prosperity and ending sanctions on Syria at the 2025 Saudi-U.S. Investment Forum in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, https://www.youtube.com/live/wj1QOz3iuCE?si=qQRR2GcqZhtt1F5o Well, thank...

April 7, 2025 Source: Press conference during Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s visit to the White House and President Donald Trump, as broadcast by C-SPAN, April 7, 2025. U.S. President Donald Trump’s plan for new tariffs...

Netanyahu praises the Obama administration for its support of Israel’s security, then roundly criticizes it for negotiating a deal with Iran that will not roll back its nuclear breakout time and for not demanding that before sanctions are lifted that Iran stop its support of terrorism and threats to wipe Israel off the map.

September 2024 By Kenneth Stein Kenneth Stein is Emeritus Professor of Contemporary Middle Eastern History, Political Science and Israel Studies at Emory University and President of the Atlanta-based Center for Israel Education. He is the author...

Israel’s opposition to Iranian entrenchment in Syria and Lebanon is twofold: To prevent Iran from building a beachhead against Israel through its proxies on Israel’s borders, and to impede development of Iran’s nuclear and long-range missile capabilities. Israel is absolutely determined and prepared to act forcefully against Iran, which could lead to a full-scale war. Israel must win this struggle against Iran, one way or another.

Can a radically hateful ideology ever be neutralized by rationality and logic?

Jordan becomes the second Arab country after Egypt (1979) to sign a peace treaty ending the state of war with Israel. The Treaty addresses boundary demarcations, water sharing, police and security cooperation, environmental issues, border crossings, administration of Muslim holy sites and other issues.

Jan. 31, 2023 In this 48-minute webinar recorded Jan. 31, 2023, two experts on Jordan, the Washington Institute’s Ghaith al-Omari and Tel Aviv University’s Asher Susser, help CIE President Ken Stein explore more than a...

Abdullah II remains studiously noncommittal in support of Donald Trump's idea for the U.S. to take over the Gaza Strip, rebuild it and relocate its Palestinian residents to other countries. With Jordan's strong economic, strategic and defense ties to Washington, no one expected the king to be effusive for Trump's suggestions for Gaza's future. Jordan lacks the economic and demographic absorptive capacities and the political interest to take another wave of Palestinians into its territory.

Jordan's King Hussein made a strategic decision to disassociate administratively from the West Bank, leaving it to focus Jordanian national identity on only the east bank of the Jordan River. The PLO subsequently negotiated with Israel to rule over some of these lands, as codified in the 1993 Oslo Accords, but no Palestinian state was promised.

Two days after the conclusion of the June 1967 War, Eshkol, recounts the series of events that led to war, the war itself and the immediate aftermath. He reaches out to Arab states for peace seeking a path to peace with her belligerent neighbors. A week later, Israel will quietly messages Cairo and Damascus through the US, hat Israel seeks an end to the conflict. No answers are received.

July 26, 1967: The Alon Plan reflects a response to Israel’s pre-1967 war border vulnerability seeking a future west bank arrangement that is not a strategic/geographic threat to Israel and its coastal plain population centers.

Five weeks after Egyptian President Anwar Sadat flew to Jerusalem in November 1977, to accelerate Egyptian – Israeli negotiations, Begin brought to President Jimmy Carter, Israel’s response to Sadat’s peace initiative: political autonomy for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. No Palestinian state was considered.

After the September 1978 Camp David Accords ended, the Carter administration diligently tried but failed to persuade Jordan's King Hussein to be part of the follow-on negotiations over Palestinian autonomy. Carter felt Hussein was obstructionist; Hussein did not believe in 1978 that the US could halt Israeli settlement building as promised then. Hussein was correct. He also believed that Palestinian Autonomy might have a negative impact on many Palestinians living in his kingdom. Hussein was skeptical of the US capacity to negotiate for his national interests. At the same time, privately, Egypt's Sadat was not displeased that the Jordanians remained out of favor with the US, and away from any negotiations that would detract from implementation of Israel's promised full withdrawal from Sinai, per their 1979 Treaty. In 1988, Hussein stepped away from the West Bank’s future; in 1994, Jordan signed a peace treaty with Israel.

Books and Documents Alon, Yoav. The Making of Jordan: Tribes, Colonialism and the Modern State. London: I.B. Tauris, 2007. Bar-Joseph, Uri. The Best of Enemies: Israel and Transjordan in the War of 1948. Abingdon: Taylor...

As Jordan’s king, Hussein tried to annex the West Bank and eastern Jerusalem while ruling them from 1948 to 1967. He lost everything west of the Jordan River after he attacked Israel to support Egypt...

Countries from Mexico south have significant Jewish populations and have played important roles in Jewish history, from the high of Guatemala’s Jorge García-Granados casting the first U.N. vote in 1947 for the creation of Israel to the...

There has been a significant revitalization of Jewish life among the Jewish communities of Latin America although they are shrinking, mostly due to emigration processes. Over the course of two generations, Latin American Jewry has transformed from mostly immigrants and immigrant communities to rooted communities of locally-born citizens and, simultaneously, of emigrants and expatriates.

Five points stressed in this Spanish-English interview: 1. Hamas’ purposeful mission as stated dozens of times by Hamas leaders in their own words and in its founding 1988 Charter is to destroy Israel, degrade support...

García-Granados, Guatemala’s ambassador to the United Nations and a member of the U.N. Special Committee on Palestine, was moved by Chaim Weizmann’s partition pleas to UNSCOP in July 1947 and cast the first vote for...

In multiple worldwide realms, the magnitude of hate for Israel and Jews soared after October 7, 2023.

Before Israel’s establishment, Zionists in Palestine had contacts with Lebanese and Syrian officials, seeking information about anti-Zionist attitudes and understanding of these Arab states’ military capabilities against Israel’s establishment and survival. Since 1949 and the...

A current map showing the political borders of Israel and its nearest neighbors in the Arab world.

From 1970 to 1984, Khaddam served as Syria’s foreign minister, and later he was Syria’s decision-maker for actions in Lebanon. He recounts Syrian anger toward Egyptian President Sadat’s slow but continual bilateral engagement and recognition of Israel. He recalls how Syrian President Assad, after a four-hour meeting, refused Henry Kissinger’s invitation to attend the 1973 Geneva peace conference, not wanting to sanction the closeness Sadat was establishing with Israel and with Washington. These were the same reasons why Syria refused President Carter’s invitation to attend a similar Middle East peace conference in 1977. Khaddam says, “We were shocked by Sadat’s actions."

Hezbollah has used its stronghold in southern Lebanon to launch continual attacks on northern Israel since October 8, 2023. Hezbollah says it is motivated by its support for Hamas, a fellow member of Iran’s Axis of Resistance surrounding Israel. While Hezbollah is Shia and Hamas is Sunni, both are devoted to Israel’s destruction, and both receive funding from and coordinate with Iran.

Books and Documents Oren Barak, The Lebanese Army: A National Institution in a Divided Society. Albany: State University of New York, 2009. Benedetta Berti, The Ongoing Battle for Beirut: Old Dynamics and New Trends, Institute...

Following the conclusion of the June 1967 War, the Israeli government sent word to Egypt and Syria seeking peace plan that was intended to jumpstart a peace process with Israel’s belligerent neighbors, Egypt and Syria. The messages were sent through the US, but no response was apparently received.

Egyptian President Sadat colluded with Syrian President Assad to attack Israel on October 6, 1973. Sadat's objective was not to seek Israel's destruction but to gain a limited success by crossing the canal. He also sought to engage American diplomacy to generate talks with Israel that would see Israeli withdrawal from Egyptian land Israel secured in the June 1967 War. Sadat took a large gamble by attacking Israel yet he unfolded a negotiating process with Israel that lasted through 1979. He achieved his overarching long-term priority of having Egyptian Sinai returned to Egyptian sovereignty.

Henry Kissinger and and Hafez al-Assad meet in Damascus in December 1973 (credit: Agence France-Presse stringer, released by Getty in January 1974). By Ken Stein Sandwiched between the end of the 1973 October Middle East...

On Golan Heights, Israel agrees to limited withdrawal; UN places forces between Syrian and Israeli armies. With few exceptions this border remains almost totally quiet for more than forty years.

President Ford promises that the US will give “weight” to any future Israeli peace agreement with Syria that Israel should remain in the Golan Heights.

This meeting between President Carter and Syrian President Assad was the only one they had during the Carter presidency. Carter wanted to learn what Assad’s requirements were for an agreement with Israel: borders, security, nature of peace and willingness of other Arabs join. Assad doubted that the Saudis would join this process. When the conversation was finished, Assad made it clear that he was not rushing into an agreement with Israel, even if asked by the United States. Carter acknowledged to Assad that he knew little about the Palestinian refugee issue. Carter did tell Assad that the U.S. was committed to the security of Israel. Assad did not say that the Soviet Union’s participation at a conference was necessary; in fact, Assad noted how difficult his relations were with Moscow in the immediate past. Assad did tell Carter that it was Secretary of State Vance who first raised the possibility of Moscow attending such a peace conference. From American diplomatic sources we learn that Assad was pleased to have been squired by Carter. For their part, the Israelis were deeply anxious about Carter’s positive statements about Assad after this meeting.

October 27, 1994 Remarks by U.S. President Bill Clinton and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad in the Great Hall of Syria’s Presidential Palace in Damascus, https://clintonwhitehouse6.archives.gov/1994/10/1994-10-27-press-conference-presidents-clinton-and-assad.html Introduction Clinton and Assad met in October 1994 a day...

Obama, to improve America’s image with Muslim public opinion, stresses that Islam is not that of the ideological radicals. His advocacy of ‘soft power’ distinguishes his administration from Bush II’s use of force. He did not state directly that Iran should be stopped from developing a nuclear weapon. He said that US commitment to Israel is ‘unbreakable.’ Nine years later Trump’s Secretary of State, also in Cairo heavily criticized Obama’s ‘soft power’ approach.

Professor Asher Susser describes the neighborhood of the Middle East, Arab nationalism, and the changing relationships of the region's states with Israel.

U.S. President Donald Trump recognizes Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights more than 37 years after Israel annexed the mountains.

The U.N. partition resolution in 1947 cleared the way for Israel to declare independence six months later, but since then the United Nations has largely been antagonistic and condemnatory toward Israel and a tool for the Palestinians and Israel's enemies.

In recognition of the anniversary of the United Nations' passage of Resolution 181 on November 29, 1947, we present our newest three-part whiteboard videos providing context to this historical moment in Jewish history.

Despite an officially anti-Zionist stance, the Soviet Union, hoping to adopt Israel as a Soviet proxy, takes a pragmatic stance and supports the U.N. partition plan of Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish states.

The UN recommended establishing Arab and Jewish states in Palestine, with an international regime for Jerusalem. Zionists were jubilant; Arab states and the Palestinians were indignant and rejected two state solution. No Arab state is established, Israel is in 1948

Subsequent to Israel's territorial successes from May 1948 forward, U.N. mediator Bernadotte is assassinated after suggesting smaller borders for Israel. He does not mention Palestinian Arabs in his interim report.

The resolution states that refugees “wishing to return to their homes and live at peace (with Israel) should do so or compensation be paid…” Israel opposes the idea because it jeopardizes Israel as a majority Jewish state.

The area of Israel expanded and the potential area for a Palestinian Arab state decreased because of the 1948-49 war, Israel’s War of Independence. The Arab rejection of the 1947 U.N. partition plan thus hurt...

Upon admission to the U.N., Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett said, "It was the consummation of a people's transition from political anonymity to clear identity, from inferiority to equal status, from mere passive protest to active responsibility, from exclusion to membership in the family of nations."

This report submitted to the United Nations at the end of 1951 notes that “some one million Jews have become the victims of accelerated antiSemitism” since 1948 in the Muslim countries of the Arab League and North Africa, “communities which have existed for thousands of years.” The report analyzes the situation for Jews overall and explains restrictions and oppressive measures country by country.

The Resolution calls for unspecified Israel withdrawal from territories in return for right of all states to live in peace. It does not call for full withdrawal. It is the basis of Egyptian (1979) and Jordanian (1994) Treaties with Israel, and PLO (1993) recognition of Israel.

The October 1973 war broke the logjam over whether diplomacy could unfold to kick off Arab-Israeli negotiations. Sadat used the 1973 war as an engine to harness American horsepower. In that he succeeded because U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger saw Sadat’s leaning to Washington not only as a chance to begin useful negotiations, but also of great significance to weaning the Egyptian president away from Moscow.

Cairo and Jerusalem agree to additional Sinai withdrawals, demilitarized zones, limited force zones and, importantly, placement of US civilians in Sinai to monitor observance of agreement.

Led by USSR and Arab states, Zionism is labeled as racist; the resolution is revoked in 1991.

Carefully sandwiched between Carter’s high-risk presidential visit to Egypt and Israel on March 10, 1979—to solve contentious disagreements between Sadat and Begin—and the Peace Treaty signing on March 26, 1979, his administration gladly votes at the UN to deplore Israeli settlement building; including demographic changes in Jerusalem. After the Peace Treaty signing, until it leaves office in 1981, the Carter administration will continue to barrage Israel with condemnation for settlement building.

This was the second UNSC Resolution within four months supported by the Carter administration condemning Israel's settlement building in the territories. It too greatly angered the Israeli government and American supporters of Israel.

Showing its public opposition to Israeli actions in the lands taken in the June 1967 war, an area that the Carter Administration wanted reserved for Palestinian self-rule, it 'strongly deplores' Israel's settlement policies. Passage of the resolution three weeks prior to the New York and Connecticut presidential primaries, cause many Jewish voters to vote in favor of Ted Kennedy and not for Carter, helping to splinter the Democratic Party.

The United States abstains on a Security Council resolution declaring Israel's Basic Law on Jerusalem to be in violation of international law.

This is the first UN resolution to call for “two States, Israel and Palestine, to live side by side within secure and recognized borders.”

As a negotiating plan it seeks an end to the conflict with reciprocal performance objectives. Israel accepts the plan with some reservations; Hamas rejects it out of hand. The plan is not enacted.

Adopted in August 2006, this UN Resolution brought the 33 day Israel-Hezbollah war to an end, but it conspicuously failed to bring the Israel-Hezbollah conflict to conclusion. Though intended, keeping Hezbollah fighters from reoccupying the Israel-Lebanese border areas was not halted, giving rise to semi continuous cross the border firings, leading to its intensification after October 2023, with Hamas attack on Israel.

Following two weeks of Israeli-Hamas fighting, it calls for a cease-fire, and for a “lasting solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by peaceful means.” The Hamas-Israeli war occurs again in 2013-2014.

Prosor accuses the UN of duplicity and hypocrisy because it is constantly critical of Israel, but not of radical Muslims for killing of Yazidis, Bahais, Kurds, and Christians.

December 23, 2016 U.N. Security Council Resolution 2334 on Israeli Settlements and East Jerusalem https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12657.doc.htm Reaffirming its relevant resolutions, including resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973), 446 (1979), 452 (1979), 465 (1980), 476 (1980), 478 (1980),...

The essence of Netanyahu’s speech was to eliminate Hezbollah as a fighting force in Lebanon. He intoned, “Don’t let Nasrallah drag Lebanon into the abyss. We’re not at war with you. We’re at war with Hezbollah, which has hijacked your country and threatens to..."

This is an excellent historical review of the relationship, including discussion of the Israel-Hamas War (31p.).

The US-Israeli relationship is complicated, dynamic, multidimensional, and enduring. From initial American governmental opposition to the present, Washington has become Israel’s most trusted ally. Rooted in common bonds, entrenched military sharing, and valued strategic interests, the association has also greatly influenced the shaping and sustenance of American Jewish identity.

Join CIE’s founding president, Ken Stein, in a conversation at 5 p.m. ET on Nov. 29 with two experts in the field of U.S.-Israel relations, Aaron David Miller and Raphael Danziger, as part of CIE’s Israel@75: A Yearlong Exploration program.

Loy Henderson, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, U.S. State Department, to U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall Writing two months before the U.S. voted at the United Nations in favor of Palestine's partition into Arab and Jewish states, Henderson voices profound dislike for Zionism and a Jewish state. He advocates for cultivating positive relations with Muslim and Arab states. He is one of many at the State Department at the time who saw Zionism as contrary to American national interests.

The clash of great powers to control the Middle East, particularly between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., neither began after World War II nor ended with the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991. Today, China, the U.S., Russia and Middle Eastern regional powers vie to influence everyday politics and resources.

President Johnson’s remarks became the philosophical outline for UN Resolution 242 passed in November 1967. Core to his view was that Israel would not need to return to the pre-1967 war borders, and that the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all states in the region should be protected.

In the days before the June 1967 war, President Lyndon Johnson warned Israel against war, saying, “If you go it alone, you will be alone.” President Joe Biden issued a similar warning in March against...

Hamilton Jordan, Carter's chief political adviser, warned the president to halt the administration's anti-Israeli actions. Nonetheless, they continued to diminish Carter's support among American Jews through the 1980 re-election campaign.

March 26, 2025 By Ken Stein The ripe conditions that prefaced the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli treaty and might presage additional Arab-Israeli agreements are almost totally absent in 2025. Why? Today, there is an absence of political...

Areas of bilateral political and military cooperation are noted to fend off Soviet involvement in the the Middle East, to assist Israel in building the Lavi aircraft, to assure an independent Lebanon, and promote Arab-Israeli negotiations.

Quietly pursued in the past, long-standing strategic ties between Israel and Gulf states have become public. Building on the historic Joint Agreement signed between Israel and the UAE in August 2020, the Abraham Accords serve as a framework for normalizing diplomatic relations between Israel, the UAE and Bahrain.

Unfold six Arab states’ embrace of Israel since 1973 out of national interests and U.S. mediation, sidelining the Palestinian movement, and explore Hamas’ Oct. 7, 2023, attack and its implications for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Israeli diplomacy.