1973 War

On October 6, 1973, Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack against Israel on the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur. Backed by arms from the Soviet Union, Egypt and Syria made significant territorial gains in Sinai and the Golan Heights. By the war’s end three weeks later, aided by military supplies from the United States, Israeli counterattacks proved successful. A UN applied ceasefire took effect and a brief Middle East Peace Conference was held in Geneva in December. Despite mistrust between the sides, Egyptian President Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Meir used the war to usher in a period of American-led diplomacy. Israelis critically investigated their failures in preparing for the war; their inquiries resulted in both the resignation of high ranking officials  and in revision of Israel’s military readiness procedures.  No treaties were signed at the end of the war, only military disengagement agreements. The diplomatic aftermath of the war evolved slowly into more detailed, secret, and direct Egyptian-Israeli diplomacy  which resulted in the 1979 Israel-Egyptian Peace Treaty.

Aker, Frank. October 1973 The Arab-Israeli War. Sarasota, FL: First Edition Design Publishing, Inc., 2014.

Allen, Peter. The Yom Kippur War. New York: Scribner, 1982.

Asher, Daniel. The Egyptian Strategy for the Yom Kippur War: An Analysis. Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2009.

Bar-Joseph, Uri. The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise of Yom Kippur and Its Sources. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005.

Baxter, Peter. Yom Kippur: No Peace, No War: October 1973. Pen & Sword Military, 2017.

Boyne, Walter J. The Two O’clock War: The 1973 Yom Kippur Conflict and the Airlift That Saved Israel. New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2002.

Brecher, Michael, and Benjamin Geist. Decisions in Crisis: Israel, 1967 and 1973. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980.

Dunstan, Simon. The Yom Kippur War 1973 (1) The Golan Heights. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, August 20, 2003.

Dunstan, Simon. The Yom Kippur War: The Arab-Israeli War of 1973. Oxford: Osprey Pub., 2007.

Even, Jacob, Maoz, Simcha B., Tlamim, Moshe, Cirillo, Roger, Avidor, Gideon. At the Decisive Point in the Sinai: Generalship in the Yom Kippur War. University Press of Kentucky, 2017.

Gawrych, George. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory. Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1996.

Ginor, Isabella, and Gideon Remez. The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967-1973: The USSR’s Military Intervention in the Egyptian-Israeli Conflict. London: Hurst, 2017.

Harkabi, Yehoshafat. October Earthquake: Yom Kippur 1973. New York: Routledge, 1974.

Herzog, Chaim. The War of Atonement: The Inside Story of the Yom Kippur War, 1973. London: Greenhill, 1998.

Kahalani, Avigdor, and Donn A. Starry. The Heights of Courage: A Tank Leader’s War on the Golan. Westport, CT: Praeger Paperback, 1992.

Kipnis, Yigal. 1973 The Road to War. Charlottesville: Just World Books, 2013

Lebel, Udi, and Eyal Leṿin. The 1973 Yom Kippur War and the Reshaping of Israeli Civil-military Relations. Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2015.

Monroe, Elizabeth, and Anthony Farrar-Hockley. The Arab-Israel War, October 1973; Background and Events. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975.

National Security Archive, “”The October War and U.S. Policy.” The October War and U.S. Policy. 

Parker, Richard Bordeaux. The October War: A Retrospective. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2001.

Rodman, David. Israel in the 1973 Yom Kippur War: Diplomacy, Battle, and Lessons. Brighton: Sussex Academic, 2016.

Sakal, Emanuel, and Moshe Tlamim. Soldier in the Sinai: A General’s Account of the Yom Kippur War. University Press of Kentucky, 2014. 

Shaleṿ, Aryeh. Israel’s Intelligence Assessment before the Yom Kippur War: Disentangling Deception and Distraction. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2010.

Siniver, Asaf (ed.). The October 1973 War Politics Diplomacy, Legacy. London: C. Hurst and Company, 2013.

United States of America. Central Intelligence Agency. William E. Colby As Director of Central Intelligence. By Harold P. Ford. 

Bar-Joseph, Uri. “The ‘Special Means of Collection’: The Missing Link in the Surprise of the Yom Kippur War.” Middle East Journal, 67:4 (2013): 531–546. 

Blanga, Yehuda. “’The Russians Are Coming, the Russians Are Coming’: American Management of the Crisis Associated with Ending the October 1973 War.” Middle Eastern Studies, 49: 4 (2013): 563-580.

Ezov, Amiram. “The Crossing Challenge: The Suez Canal Crossing by the Israel Defense Forces During the Yom Kippur War of 1973.” The Journal of Military History, 82:2 (2018): 461-490.

Kahana, Ephraim. “Early Warning Versus Concept: The Case of the Yom Kippur War 1973.” Intelligence and National Security, 17:2 (2002): 81-104.

Levey, Zach. “Anatomy of an airlift: United States military assistance to Israel during the 1973 war,” Cold War History 8:4 (October 2008): 481-501.

Orkibi, Eithan. “Resisting the Cultural Division of Protest: The Israeli Demobilized Reservists’ Protest After the Yom Kippur War (1973-1974). Cultural Dynamics, 29: 1-2 (2017): 23-38.

Rezk, Dina. “Re-Evaluating the Yom Kippur ‘Intelligence Failure’: The Cultural Lens in Crisis.” The International History Review, 39:3 (2017): 470-495.

Rodman, David. “The Impact of American Arms Transfers to Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur War,” Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, 7:3 (July 2013): 107-114.

Sheffy, Yigal. “Overcoming strategic weakness: The Egyptian deception and the Yom Kippur War,” Intelligence and National Security, 21:5 (January 2007): 809-828.

Tal, David. “Who Needed the October 1973 War?” Middle Eastern Studies, 52:5 (2016): 737-753.

Shlaim, Avi. “Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Yom Kippur War,” World Politics, 28:3 (April 1976): 348-380.