The Declaration recounts the Jewish connection to the Land of Israel, the birth of Zionism and U.N. recognition of a Jewish state’s legitimacy. It also promises that the state will be a democracy for all its citizens.
This 10-page report, written by the British Colonial and Foreign Office, along with the 1937 Peel (Royal) Commission Report, is one of the two best summaries of the British presence in Palestine. Both are substantial in terms of content, detail and analyses; both were written from Britain’s perspective. Read these along with 1931 Census for Palestine to have a fuller grasp of the politics and the populations that shaped Britain’s Palestine’s administration from 1918-1948
Subsequent to Israel’s territorial successes from May 1948 forward, U.N. mediator Bernadotte is assassinated after suggesting smaller borders for Israel. He does not mention Palestinian Arabs in his interim report.
Upon admission to the U.N., Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett said, “It was
the consummation of a people’s transition from political anonymity to clear identity, from inferiority to equal status, from mere passive protest to active responsibility, from exclusion to membership in the family of nations.”
This report submitted to the United Nations at the end of 1951 notes that “some one million Jews have become the victims of accelerated antiSemitism” since 1948 in the Muslim countries of the Arab League and North Africa, “communities which have existed for thousands of years.” The report analyzes the situation for Jews overall and explains restrictions and oppressive measures country by country.
In an impassioned Knesset speech, Menachem Begin staunchly opposes accepting $1.5 billion in German reparations for Jewish deaths during WWII. No price, he believes, can be put on the lives lost.
Further reinforcing the Truman Doctrine, the US President promises military or economic aid to any Middle Eastern country resisting Communist aggression.
The Romanian president told Menachem Begin that Egyptian President Sadat was interested in negotiations with the Israelis. This secret visit took place three weeks before Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan met secretly with Egyptian Vice President Hasan Tuhami in Morocco.
Unknown to the Carter administration and one month before it issued the US-Soviet Declaration to convene an international Middle East Peace Conference, Prime Minister Begin tells the cabinet that he learned from the Rumanian president that Sadat wishes to have Israeli and Egyptian representatives meet in secret talks. That bi-lateral Dayan -Tuhami meeting takes place on September 16. Begin refers to advanced drafts of proposed treaties between Israel and each Arab state; he presents details about Rumanian Jewish immigration to Israel.
Naively, the Carter Administration believes that a conference with the USSR would start comprehensive negotiations; instead, the fear of Moscow’s engagement helps drive direct Egyptian-Israeli talks.
It calls for “recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, a just solution to the
Palestinian problem, the right to self-determination, [and] for PLO association to the negotiations.”
In Aprili 1987, the Jordanian King and Israeli Labor Party leaders secretly outlined a plan to convene an international conference to move Israeli-Palestinian talks forward through a conference format, but Likud opposition leaders in Israel squashed the idea.
As part of the preparations for the Fall 1991 Madrid Peace Conference, US Secretary of State James Baker drafted a memorandum of agreement between the US and Israel regarding the particulars of resuming the Arab-Israeli peace process. He opens by reiterating that the intention of the negotiations is to achieve a regional peace agreement based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
After the 1991 Gulf War, the US orchestrates a conference with Israel, multiple Arab states, and Palestinians participating; the conference leads to bilateral and multilateral negotiations.
Four days before signing the Oslo Accords, the PLO and Israel recognize each other. Israel’s
Rabin worries about the growth of Hamas influence, thus elevates the PLO through international recognition.
Negotiated through the Norwegians, the Accords call for limited Palestinian rule in some of the territories; it did not call for a Palestinian state or an end to settlements.
This is the third (1971 and 1985) and most extensive trade agreement signed between Israel and the EC/EU, emphasizing that more than half of all Israeli exports are to Europe. Virtually every conceivable area of sharing and exchange is noted in the agreement.
In the midst of severe Palestinian-Israeli clashes, the Report concluded as had many previous investigations that the two communities feared, disdained, and wanted to live separately from one another. From the report flowed the EU, UN, US, commitment to a two-state solution suggested in the 2003 Road Map for Peace.
As a negotiating plan it seeks an end to the conflict with reciprocal performance objectives. Israel accepts the plan with some reservations; Hamas rejects it out of hand. The plan is not enacted.
European Parliament calls for recognition of Palestinian statehood in the context for a negotiated two-state solution for Palestinians and Israelis; it outlines the political and geographic contours for a negotiated outcome.
Under the deal between Iran and five world powers, Iran agreed to dismantle much of its nuclear program in exchange for billions of dollars of sanctions relief. Israel called the deal too lenient. On May 8, 2018, President Trump withdrew the U.S. from the JCPOA, calling it one of the “worst and most one-sided” agreements in U.S. history. Israel’s objectives in attacking Iran in June 2025 focused on the same central features Israel argued a decade earlier were not sufficiently addressed in the JCPOA.
PA President Abbas makes requests and gives promises to the French president for the establishment of a Palestinian
state. His commitments were not negotiated with Israel. They are meant to seek support for the end of the Gaza war,
the affirmation of Abbas and the PA as the sole Palestinian political address, and international support for a Palestinian state.
As in the past, the PA and Abbas seek international support to pressure Israel into undesirable political actions.
Seized by the severity of the Gaza war and nonmovement on a Palestinian-Israeli negotiating process, the U.N. offers a diplomatic road map to end the war and start negotiations. Led by France and Saudi Arabia, it asserts PA primacy as the legitimate Palestinian political representative, addresses possible Palestinian governance reform, seeks to empower a sovereign and economically viable state of Palestine living side by side in security with Israel, and contains other vague PA promises. Israel and the U.S. reject the Declaration. The Israeli government refuses to have outside parties determine the outlines or pace of negotiations with any country because negotiations impact Israeli security today and tomorrow.
President Macron’s speech links the end of Hamas-Israeli conflict to the evolution of a of two-state solution. He acknowledges that Israel has the power to end the war and evolve a Palestinian state, asserting that if Israel does neither to the satisfaction of France and her European partners, Israel could pay an undisclosed price. He offers no such penalties to be placed on the PA for its failure to meet its commitments. Once again the Palestinian Arab national movement uses the international community to pressure Israel into concessions. On the same day, Israeli
Prime Minister Netanyahu emphatically rejects the establishment of a Palestinian state west of the Jordan River. The Israeli
parliament in June 2004 rejected any unilateral recognition of a Palestinian state by a 68-9 vote.
