Begin agrees to halt settlements construction only for the duration of the peace treaty negotiations, not until Palestinian autonomy is applied. Carter erroneously believes that Begin made a promise to halt settlements.
With President Carter mediating, Sadat and Begin agree to two outlines: a framework for a treaty between them and to define Palestinian “autonomy,” not self-determination or a state for them.
September 16, 1978 Source: Israel State Archives/Box/A4314/1. Notes taken by Simcha Dinitz. Discussion at Camp David, Maryland, on the use of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 Top Secret Participants: Vance, Mondale, Brzezinski, Lewis, Dayan, Barak…
This meeting between Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and the Israeli delegation exemplified the injection of US interests and the application of concerted diplomatic pressure on Israel. The Israeli delegation at Camp David repeatedly refused the Carter administration’s vigorous efforts to introduce new formulations that might ultimately result in a Palestinian state.
September 7, 1978 Source: Israel State Archives/Box/A4314/1. Notes taken by Elyakim Rubinstein. By the time the American, Egyptian and Israeli delegations convened at Camp David, dozens of direct meetings had occurred between Israeli and Egyptian…
September 6, 1978, 6 p.m. Source: Israel State Archives/Box/A4314/1 Notes taken by Elyakim Rubinstein in the Israeli delegation’s discussion about a meeting Prime Minister Menachem Begin had with President Jimmy Carter and President Anwar Sadat…
The documents reveal the very advanced state of Washington’s success in finding compromise language, of terms, and principles for achieving Egyptian and Israeli agreement on bi-lateral matters and about Palestinian West Bank self-rule (Begin’s ideas). Enormous compatible detail found with significant gaps remaining before the early September Camp Summit started. The US went to Camp David with outlines of possible agreements already drafted.
As part of a joint statement, President Carter makes promises regarding US’ role in coming Political-Military Committee Talks in Cairo and Jerusalem. Likewise presenting a four-point formula for resolving the conflict, these statements contribute to US-Israeli tensions.
Having made human rights a central pillar of his foreign policy, Carter nonetheless seemingly ignored the abuses the Shah of Iran imposed upon his own people. Carter’s unctuous praise for the Shah at this state dinner angered Iranians in general, the clerical regime that replaced the Shah in 1979, resulting in negative consequences for Carter as he went into the 1980 presidential election.
Five weeks after Egyptian President Anwar Sadat flew to Jerusalem in November 1977, to accelerate Egyptian – Israeli negotiations, Begin brought to President Jimmy Carter, Israel’s response to Sadat’s peace initiative: political autonomy for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. No Palestinian state was considered.
After brutally frank and caustic meetings between Israeli Foreign Minister Dayan and President Carter, the US relents to Israeli demands that a peace conference be only an opening for direct talks.
Naively, the Carter Administration believes that a conference with the USSR would start comprehensive negotiations; instead, the fear of Moscow’s engagement helps drive direct Egyptian-Israeli talks.
September 28, 1977 Memorandum of conversations between President Jimmy Carter and Syrian Foreign Minister Abdel Halim Khaddam and between Khaddam and U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, White House, Washington Source: Foreign Relations of the…
The vast gulf in US and Israeli positions about Palestinian self-determination, the degree of withdrawal from the West Bank, and future borders is precisely stated. A year later at the end of the Camp David negotiations, Israeli and US views had not changed at all.
After his surprise electoral victory in May, Prime Minister Menachem Begin traveled to Washington to establish a rapport with President Carter. While this initial meeting was cordial, each met the other’s stubbornness, a characteristic that would keep their relationship respectful but acrid for years to come.
Begin tells Carter that Judea, Samaria (the West Bank) and the Gaza Strip will not be placed under foreign sovereignty; likewise, these areas will not be annexed, leaving them open for possible negotiations.
This meeting between President Carter and Syrian President Assad was the only one they had during the Carter presidency. Carter wanted to learn what Assad’s requirements were for an agreement with Israel: borders, security, nature of peace and willingness of other Arabs join. Assad doubted that the Saudis would join this process. When the conversation was finished, Assad made it clear that he was not rushing into an agreement with Israel, even if asked by the United States. Carter acknowledged to Assad that he knew little about the Palestinian refugee issue. Carter did tell Assad that the U.S. was committed to the security of Israel. Assad did not say that the Soviet Union’s participation at a conference was necessary; in fact, Assad noted how difficult his relations were with Moscow in the immediate past. Assad did tell Carter that it was Secretary of State Vance who first raised the possibility of Moscow attending such a peace conference. From American diplomatic sources we learn that Assad was pleased to have been squired by Carter. For their part, the Israelis were deeply anxious about Carter’s positive statements about Assad after this meeting.
When the Carter Administration entered office in 1977, an early foreign policy priority was to kick-start Middle East negotiations. In this Policy Review Committee Meeting, Carter’s staff proposed a negotiating outcome that would pass through a conference, including the withdrawal of Israel’s forces to almost the 1967 borders, bringing the PLO into talks as Palestinian representatives, all the while seeking to uphold Israel’s security requirements.
Carefully stated, Carter says that there should be a homeland for the Palestinian refugees. He is the first US president to assert the need for a place for the Palestinians and for Israel’s right to exist in peace.
With candor, Israeli Foreign Minister Allon tells Secretary of State Vance that the Israeli Labor government would under no circumstances negotiate with the PLO until it gave up terrorism, recognized UNSC 242, and unequivocally accepted Israel’s right to exist. Only in 1993, did the PLO accept these premises, Sixteen years had then passed while Israel built settlements virtually without restraint in the territories.
Outlining an Arab-Israeli settlement, it calls for Israeli withdrawal to “almost the pre-June War borders” and “extensive Palestinian autonomy.” The Carter Administration embraces the report for its policy.
For the first time a US State Department official states the “legitimate interests of the Palestinian Arabs must be taken into account in the negotiating of an Arab-Israeli peace.”
The US promises coordination with Israel on resumed negotiations, not to negotiate or recognize
the PLO until it recognizes Israel’s right to exist, and accepts UNSC Resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973).
Cairo and Jerusalem agree to additional Sinai withdrawals, demilitarized zones, limited force zones and, importantly, placement of US civilians in Sinai to monitor observance of agreement.
