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Documents and Sources
Great Powers and the Middle East
<span class="cie-plus-title">Memorandum of Conversation of Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan and Defense Minister Ezer Weizman With U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown at Camp David, September 7, 1978</span><span class="cie-plus-badge">CIE+</span>

Memorandum of Conversation of Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan and Defense Minister Ezer Weizman With U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown at Camp David, September 7, 1978CIE+

Early during the Camp David summit, Moshe Dayan, Ezer Weizman and other Israeli officials address resettlement and payment of 1967 and 1948 Palestinian refugees and Israeli military redeployment on the eastern and western borders, while Zbigniew Brzezinski, Cyrus Vance and other Americans emphasize Palestinian sovereignty.

Documents and Sources|September 7, 1978
<span class="cie-plus-title">Secretary of State Cyrus Vance Meets With Israeli Delegation at Camp David, September 14, 1978</span><span class="cie-plus-badge">CIE+</span>

Secretary of State Cyrus Vance Meets With Israeli Delegation at Camp David, September 14, 1978CIE+

This meeting between Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and the Israeli delegation exemplified the injection of US interests and the application of concerted diplomatic pressure on Israel. The Israeli delegation at Camp David repeatedly refused the Carter administration’s vigorous efforts to introduce new formulations that might ultimately result in a Palestinian state.

Documents and Sources|September 14, 1978
<span class="cie-plus-title">U.S., Israeli Negotiators at Camp David Discuss Resolution 242, September 16, 1978</span><span class="cie-plus-badge">CIE+</span>

U.S., Israeli Negotiators at Camp David Discuss Resolution 242, September 16, 1978CIE+

U.S. and Israeli officials at Camp David spend a session focused on the land-for-peace U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 and how it applies to the West Bank, Jordan, Israel and the Palestinians. Appropriate for a discussion over 242, whose application depends on the absence of the word “the,” the officials argue over using boundary, border, line, borderline or something else.

Documents and Sources|September 16, 1978
Camp David Accords, 1978

Camp David Accords, 1978

With President Carter mediating, Sadat and Begin agree to two outlines: a framework for a treaty between them and to define Palestinian “autonomy,” not self-determination or a state for them.

Documents and Sources|September 17, 1978
<span class="cie-plus-title">Protocol of Conversation Among President Carter, Prime Minister Begin, Secretary of State Vance, Foreign Minister Dayan and Israeli Attorney General Barak, September 1978</span><span class="cie-plus-badge">CIE+</span>

Protocol of Conversation Among President Carter, Prime Minister Begin, Secretary of State Vance, Foreign Minister Dayan and Israeli Attorney General Barak, September 1978CIE+

This document is the only known official written transcript of the Begin-Carter discussion held at the end of the 1978 Camp David negotiations about any moratorium on Israel’s future settlement building. This record shows that Begin made no mention of a moratorium on settlement building for longer than three months. However, President Carter publicly, and Secretary of State Vance, in his memoirs, Hard Choices disagreed, believing the time mentioned was five years. For the remainder of Carter’s presidency, and for the rest of his post-presidency, the ‘building of Israeli settlements’ became a key point of contention in shaping his relationship with Israel.

Documents and Sources|September 20, 1978
<span class="cie-plus-title">Moshe Dayan’s Remarks to the Knesset About the 1978 Camp David Accords</span><span class="cie-plus-badge">CIE+</span>

Moshe Dayan’s Remarks to the Knesset About the 1978 Camp David AccordsCIE+

Dayan made the case to the knesset that it should vote in favor of the Camp David Accords stipulating why doing so would be in Israel’s long term interest. He stated specifically that there was no promise for a Palestinian state, IDF forces would remain in the West Bank, negotiations for a peace treaty would continue, and these agreements were signed by the President of Egypt and the President of the US.

Documents and Sources|September 29, 1978
<span class="cie-plus-title">Conversation Between U.S. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and Saudi Prince Fahd on Camp David Accords and Other Regional Issues, March 1979</span><span class="cie-plus-badge">CIE+</span>

Conversation Between U.S. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and Saudi Prince Fahd on Camp David Accords and Other Regional Issues, March 1979CIE+

Nine days before the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli treaty, U.S. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud carry out an extraordinarily frank conversation. It includes bilateral relations, common fears of regional turbulence and Anwar Sadat’s estrangement from other Arab leaders.

Documents and Sources|March 17, 1979
<span class="cie-plus-title">U.N. Security Council Resolution 465 on Jerusalem, Settlements and Territories, 1980</span><span class="cie-plus-badge">CIE+</span>

U.N. Security Council Resolution 465 on Jerusalem, Settlements and Territories, 1980CIE+

Showing its public opposition to Israeli actions in the lands taken in the June 1967 war, an area that the Carter Administration
wanted reserved for Palestinian self-rule, it ‘strongly deplores’ Israel’s settlement policies. Passage of the resolution three weeks
prior to the New York and Connecticut presidential primaries, cause many Jewish voters to vote in favor of Ted Kennedy
and not for Carter, helping to splinter the Democratic Party.

Documents and Sources|March 1, 1980
<span class="cie-plus-title">Summary of President Jimmy Carter’s Meetings With King Hussein, 1980</span><span class="cie-plus-badge">CIE+</span>

Summary of President Jimmy Carter’s Meetings With King Hussein, 1980CIE+

After the September 1978 Camp David Accords ended, the Carter administration diligently tried but failed to persuade Jordan’s King Hussein to be part of the follow-on negotiations over Palestinian autonomy. Carter felt Hussein was obstructionist; Hussein did not believe in 1978 that the US could halt Israeli settlement building as promised then. Hussein was correct. He also believed that Palestinian Autonomy might have a negative impact on many Palestinians living in his kingdom. Hussein was skeptical of the US capacity to negotiate for his national interests. At the same time, privately, Egypt’s Sadat was not displeased that the Jordanians remained out of favor with the US, and away from any negotiations that would detract from implementation of Israel’s promised full withdrawal from Sinai, per their 1979 Treaty. In 1988, Hussein stepped away from the West Bank’s future; in 1994, Jordan signed a peace treaty with Israel.

Documents and Sources|June 16 and 17, 1980
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