Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser asserts that the conflict with Israel is not over access to the Gulf of Aqaba but the very existence of Israel; Egypt’s foes are Britain and the United States, which support Israel.
The Israeli ambassador to the United Nations delivers a detailed outline of events that will lead to war two days later.
The Israel State Archives’ “The Six Day War Files” includes Cabinet and Security Cabinet meeting transcripts that were classified for 50 years.
Foreign Minister Abba Eban addressed the U.N. Security Council one day after the Six-Day War began and as Israel was moving from fear of destruction to an extraordinary military victory. He framed Israel’s self-defense after weeks of mounting danger and emotional drain.
After the Israeli army swept through Sinai in four days, the Egyptian president acknowledges the success of Israel’s pre-emptive strike but blames the U.S. and Britain. Still, he takes responsibility for the Arab defeat and resigns.
Two days after the conclusion of the June 1967 War, Eshkol, recounts the series of events that led to war, the war itself and the immediate aftermath. He reaches out to Arab states for peace seeking a path to peace with her belligerent neighbors. A week later, Israel will quietly messages Cairo and Damascus through the US, hat Israel seeks an end to the conflict. No answers are received.
Ambassador Abba Eban tells the U.N. why Israel had to fight the war earlier in June 1967 and calls for new efforts for regional peace.
After the June 1967 war, the Israeli government sent word through the United States to Egypt and Syria seeking to jump-start a peace process. Apparently no response was received.
President Johnson’s remarks became the philosophical outline for UN Resolution 242 passed in November 1967. Core to his view was that Israel would not need to return to the pre-1967 war borders, and that the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all states in the region should be protected.
Receiving an honorary doctorate from the Hebrew University after the conclusion of the June 1967 War, Rabin delivers a speech on behalf of Israel’s entire military. He highlights the harsh realities of war yet concentrates on commending the extraordinary efforts of Israel’s armed forces.
Yigal Allon’s plan for handling the areas captured from Jordan during the just-completed Six-Day War reflects Israel’s previous border vulnerability and seeks a West Bank arrangement that is not a strategic or geographic threat.
Arab states declare “no peace, no negotiation, no recognition” with Israel after their collective defeat in the June 1967 War.
Resolution 242 calls for Israeli withdrawal from unspecified captured territories in return for the right of all states to live in peace. It does not call for a full withdrawal. It is the basis for treaties with Egypt (1979) and Jordan (1994) and for PLO recognition of Israel (1993).
From the Israel Government Yearbook, an 11 page description of the June War.
March 1968 “The Six-Day War,” Israel Government Year Book, 5728 (1967-68), March 1968, Central Office of Information, Prime Minister’s Office The Six-Day War The short, sharp encounter that has come to be known as the…
The law authorizes appointed Israeli panels to investigate matters of public concern and state interest. These independent bodies are among Israeli democracy’s most trusted institutions, but there is not mechanism in the law to require their creation.
This volume of the U.S. government’s “Foreign Relations of the United States” series provides foreign policy documents on the Arab-Israeli conflict before, during and after the October 1973 war.
October 6, 2023, was the 50th anniversary of the outbreak of the October 1973 war. Six months prior, Egyptian President Sadat sent his national security adviser to meet with Secretary of State Kissinger to determine whether the U.S. would engage Egypt and Israel in serious mediation for a Sinai agreement, or a series of them, all focused on Israeli withdrawal and gradual acceptance of Israel. Kissinger did not take Sadat’s overtures seriously. Would American action then have avoided the October 1973 war? All informed analyses say no.
Prime Minister Golda Meir in her address to the Knesset since the beginning of the October War, recounts the war’s status on the Golan Heights and in the Suez Canal area. She reveals that an Israeli task force had crossed the Suez Canal and was fighting on the west bank of that waterway.
In carrying out research in the 1990s for Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace, Routledge, 1999, I undertook 84 interviews with individuals who participated in the diplomacy.
The October 1973 war broke the logjam over whether diplomacy could unfold to kick off Arab-Israeli negotiations. Sadat used the 1973 war as an engine to harness American horsepower. In that he succeeded because U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger saw Sadat’s leaning to Washington not only as a chance to begin useful negotiations, but also of great significance to weaning the Egyptian president away from Moscow.
The U.S. mediates an agreement separating forces in Sinai after the October 1973 war. Egyptian and Israeli generals will negotiate additional details.
An Israeli commission of inquiry assigns responsibility to military leaders for failures before and during the Yom Kippur War. Prime Minister Meir and Defense Minister Dayan avoid direct blame but soon resign.
On the Golan Heights, Israel agrees to a limited withdrawal, and the United Nations places forces between the Syrian and Israeli armies. With few exceptions this border remains quiet for more than 40 years.
