The resolution states that refugees “wishing to return to their homes and live at peace (with Israel) should do so or compensation be paid.” Israel opposes the idea because it jeopardizes Israel as a majority-Jewish state.
One of four agreements Israel signed in 1949 with Arab neighbors, it does not end the state of war between Israel and Egypt. They do not sign a treaty until 1979.
Sharett gives an overview of Israeli foreign policy, key issues, and relationships with UN and Arab states.
This report submitted to the United Nations at the end of 1951 notes that “some one million Jews have become the victims of accelerated antiSemitism” since 1948 in the Muslim countries of the Arab League and North Africa, “communities which have existed for thousands of years.” The report analyzes the situation for Jews overall and explains restrictions and oppressive measures country by country.
With crisp analysis, Haganah Commander Yigal Allon, later a Prime Minister of Israel attributes Israel’s successes to multiple factors including the absence of a centralized Arab command, limited Arab military training, underestimating the potential fighting capabilities of local Arabs, and Israel’s success in integrating its citizens into the war effort.
Further reinforcing the Truman Doctrine, the US President promises military or economic aid to any Middle Eastern country resisting Communist aggression.
Golda Meir tells the U.N. General Assembly that Israel will comply with demands that it withdraw to the 1949 armistice lines with Egypt, but it expects U.N. support to keep the Straits of Tiran open.
Palestine Liberation Organization seeks Israel’s destruction through armed struggle. It retains this stated policy until December 1988.
Ten days before the start of the Six-Day War, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser declares that Egypt, Syria and other Arab states intend to destroy Israel.
With tensions on its borders, Eshkol tries to reassure Israeli public. Instead he gives a “painfully faltering” speech. Popular and party disgruntlement follow, opening the way for Eshkol to turn over the Defense Ministry two days later to General Moshe Dayan.
Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser asserts that the conflict with Israel is not over access to the Gulf of Aqaba but the very existence of Israel; Egypt’s foes are Britain and the United States, which support Israel.
The Israeli ambassador to the United Nations delivers a detailed outline of events that will lead to war two days later.
Foreign Minister Abba Eban addressed the U.N. Security Council one day after the Six-Day War began and as Israel was moving from fear of destruction to an extraordinary military victory. He framed Israel’s self-defense after weeks of mounting danger and emotional drain.
After the Israeli army swept through Sinai in four days, the Egyptian president acknowledges the success of Israel’s pre-emptive strike but blames the U.S. and Britain. Still, he takes responsibility for the Arab defeat and resigns.
Ambassador Abba Eban tells the U.N. why Israel had to fight the war earlier in June 1967 and calls for new efforts for regional peace.
After the June 1967 war, the Israeli government sent word through the United States to Egypt and Syria seeking to jump-start a peace process. Apparently no response was received.
President Johnson’s remarks became the philosophical outline for UN Resolution 242 passed in November 1967. Core to his view was that Israel would not need to return to the pre-1967 war borders, and that the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all states in the region should be protected.
Yigal Allon’s plan for handling the areas captured from Jordan during the just-completed Six-Day War reflects Israel’s previous border vulnerability and seeks a West Bank arrangement that is not a strategic or geographic threat.
Arab states declare “no peace, no negotiation, no recognition” with Israel after their collective defeat in the June 1967 War.
Resolution 242 calls for Israeli withdrawal from unspecified captured territories in return for the right of all states to live in peace. It does not call for a full withdrawal. It is the basis for treaties with Egypt (1979) and Jordan (1994) and for PLO recognition of Israel (1993).
March 1968 “The Six-Day War,” Israel Government Year Book, 5728 (1967-68), March 1968, Central Office of Information, Prime Minister’s Office The Six-Day War The short, sharp encounter that has come to be known as the…
Without any consultation with Jerusalem, Israel rejects US proposal for full withdrawal.
One of Israel’s greatest writers, Natan Alterman, reminded Israel’s accusers in 1969 that well into the 20th century the Palestinians did not even understand themselves as a separate people with a distinctive national identity marking them off from other Arabs. His argument, if framed as a question, might be formulated along these lines: If no one else, not least the Palestinians’ ancestors, saw their distinctive nation in Ottoman Palestine, how can the Zionists be blamed for not seeing one either? Thus, to fault the Zionists for failing to see what was not yet visible to anyone else, including the Palestinians, is to fault them not for suffering from blindness, but for lacking clairvoyance.
This volume of the U.S. government’s “Foreign Relations of the United States” series provides foreign policy documents on the Arab-Israeli conflict before, during and after the October 1973 war.
