Documents and Sources

G-d promises Jews a great nation in return for observance of belief and practice of laws.

The Hebrew Bible, Prophetic Books, the Talmud, the daily prayer book, and ancient Jewish texts reinforce Judaism’s relationship to G-d and Eretz Yisrael.

Major motivations for some Jews to choose Zionism included their failure to gain civic equality with their non-Jewish neighbors, and increasing outbreaks of rampant anti-Semitism. This account of the miserable economic situation of Jews in eastern Europe was another impetus for Jews to change their economic, political, and social condition through immigration.

Eventual founding leader of the World Zionist Organization Theodor Herzl says a Jewish state is need in response to antisemitism.

Max Nordau's impassioned speech summarizes the unique Jewish identity of belief, Torah, ritual and community. With those central elements as a people, their state of impoverishment and wretched physical insecurity, he argues, are vital for rebuilding the Jewish national territory.

Three European journalists provide firsthand accounts of the First Zionist Congress and its delegates.

The Sharif of Mecca and Sir Henry McMahon, a British official in Cairo speaking for the Foreign Office, exchange letters about the current war effort against the Turks and the future political status of specific Arab lands in the Ottoman Empire. McMahon says, as he repeats in 1937, that the area of Palestine is excluded from any area to be provided to an Arab leader after World War I. The British instead allow the area of Palestine to develop as a "national home for the Jewish people."

Britain and France secretly divide the Arab provinces of the reeling Ottoman Empire to meet their own geopolitical interests. They offer no concern for the political aspirations of indigenous populations.

Chaim Weizmann advocates for Great Britain to be Palestine's post-WWI administrator, seeking inclusion of specific territories for its boundaries, six months before Britain issues the Balfour Declaration.

The British Foreign Ministry promises to work toward a Jewish national home in Palestine with no harm to non-Jewish populations or to Jews living elsewhere who might want to support a Jewish home.

Emir Faisal, on behalf of the Sharif of Mecca, and Chaim Weizmann, on behalf of the Zionist Organization, exchange recognition of cordiality and kinship between a future Arab state and Palestine, where Zionists seek to establish their national home. They offer each other mutual assistance.

A Zionist delegation to the Paris Peace Conference makes an effective, largely successful case for the League of Nations to incorporate a future Jewish national home into the British Mandate for Palestine.

Herbert Samuel, soon to serve as Britain's first high commissioner for Palestine and the only Jew to hold the role, notes reasons for Arab political infighting, the origins of Arab dislike of Zionism, how land sales to Jews generate Arab jealousies, Jewish educational focus and the potential of the region of Palestine to support 4 million people.

The post-WWI San Remo Conference allocates former Ottoman territories to Britain and France and recognizes Jewish self-determination in Palestine by adopting the language of the Balfour Declaration, decisions the League of Nations confirms two years later.

For more than a century, Arab and Muslim leaders have expressed hatred for Jews, Zionism and Israel, although some have pointed internally for the failures of the Palestinian Arab national movement.

In early May 1921, communal riots unfolded in the city of Jaffa and at Jewish settlements along the coast, with considerable loss of life and property for both communities. The British decide that both Arabs and Jews had real as well as exaggerated fears of the other.

Primary sources, reputable scholarship and archival materials collectively show major communal (Arab-Jewish) socio-economic separation, factors that foreshadowed geo-spatial partition.

With intentioned ambiguity, Britain asserts that its goal in Palestine is not to make it wholly Jewish or subordinate the Arab population. Self-determination is not promised. Britain wants to remain an umpire between the communities. Naively, it thinks it can control communal expectations and keep the peace.

International legitimacy is granted to establish a Jewish National Home in Palestine. Rules for its establishment clearly give Jews in Palestine distinct advantages over the local Arab population.

Using published archives, press conferences, speeches and numerous interviews, this compilation of quotations traces how official American views on Zionism and Israel have evolved over a century.

Annual reports to the League of Nations address the status and progress of the British Mandate for Palestine,

Ze'ev Jabotinsky argues that peaceful coexistence between Arabs and Jews in Palestine is impossible until Zionists demonstrate through strength that they are an irreversible presence in the Land of Israel.

JNF meeting minutes and other statements show the strategic approach to Jewish land purchases throughout the British Mandate period.

Palestine's High Commissioner Chancellor seeks to halt the Jewish National Home in favor of the Arabs. He fails to overcome the Zionist drive and Arab unwillingness to cooperate with his intentions.

Two letters detail how Arab peasants are sometimes swindled out of their lands by Arab land brokers and effendis, noting economic harm to them, and how they learn to avoid landlords and sell directly to Jewish buyers. Intra-Arab communal tension rises.

The sale of Zirin Village to the Jewish National Fund was collusively undertaken by a local Arab family through the British Courts in Palestine. The process intentionally avoided financial compensation to the resident Arab occupants.

Palestinian Arabs' own words, backed by the observations of British and Zionist officials, show that their awareness that their own people were helping the Zionist causes through land sales, often displacing Arab peasants.

An invaluable glimpse at Palestine's population: gaping socio-economic distances and vast communal differences between Muslims, Christians and Jews that set the strong preferences for separation of the populations.

Zionists decide to hold the first international sports games in Tel Aviv bringing 400 Jewish athletes from 18 countries. The games open on March 28, 1932. Zionists value the games as a "possible awakening of youth in the Diaspora" to Zionism and the positive economic outcome for the Jewish community in Palestine.

A report presented at the 18th Zionist Congress looks at the present and future of Jewish agricultural settlement and expansion in Mandatory Palestine, including the export market.

Five Arab political parties sent a memorandum of protest to the British asking for a halt to Jewish immigration, a stoppage in Arab land sales to Jews,and a measure of self-determination. The British did not change their policies in these three areas. In 1939, they did severely limit Jewish land purchases and severely curtailed Jewish immigration.

This four-page assessment notes multiple Jewish contributions to Palestine's development: expansion of health care, advancement of agricultural methods, government revenue, industrial growth and Jewish building expansion. It notes that the Jewish economy has attracted Arab immigration to Palestine for jobs and the mushrooming of the Jewish education system from Jewish sources. Without saying so directly, its contents tout Jewish state building.

Ben-Gurion recognized that Arab opposition to Zionism is a national feeling and that Palestinian Arab leadership had done little to help the majority impoverished peasant population.

After outbreak of communal violence, the British investigatory committee suggests partition of Palestine, seeking to create two states for two peoples.

Speculation again abounds whether a two state solution might be a seriously considered outcome to Palestinian-Israeli differences. A long history of its mention but not its implementation persists. Advocacy by external voices persists, but no one seems ready to make the critical political trade-offs required.

With more Arab sale offers than funds for purchases, Zionist leaders decide on strategic priorities and designate areas around Haifa, Jerusalem-Jaffa road, and the Galilee near headwaters of the Jordan River.

After the British suggested partition of Palestine into two states in July 1937, Weizmann, among Zionists, was least opposed to a Jewish state in less than all of western Palestine.

This document was secured at the Central Zionist Archives in Jerusalem. Less than a year before Hitler invaded Poland, Arab leaders with an interest in Palestine are starkly disappointed that the the German government did not go to war against the Zionists in Palestine. The same leaders give the Zionist national builders high marks for their perseverance against terrorist bands in the Palestinian countryside. They worry that unless Arab states come to the Palestinians’ assistance, Palestine will be lost to the Zionists. A remarkable assessment for Palestinian Arab leaders and their supporters.

Pressure from Arab leaders in states surrounding Palestine, growing instability in the eastern Mediterranean, and a firm opposition voiced by the British High Commissioner in Egypt, Miles Lampson, caused the British to withdraw the idea of resolving the Arab-Zionist conflict with a two-state solution. Instead, heavy restrictions were imposed in 1939 on the growth of the Jewish National home. Coincidently this policy statement is issued, two days after Nazi Germany attacks Jewish, homes, businesses and synagogues, in what came to be known as Kristallnacht.

A description details the economic devastation caused by the 1936-1939 Arab disturbances in Palestine to the majority rural population. This followed the annually poor crop yields of the early 1930s, and the vast rural wreckage caused by WWI.

Mufti opposes Arab majority state in ten years contrary to wishes of a dozen key other Palestinian leaders. Mufti wants no Jewish political presence in Palestine whatsoever.

A British investigation in 1939, before the release of that year's anti-Jewish White Paper, finds that the area of Palestine was not promised to the Sharif of Mecca during World War I as part of a caliphate.

Zionist leaders—David Ben-Gurion, Chaim Weizmann and Eliezer Kaplan—learning of the British intent to limit severely the Jewish national home’s growth. Increasingly, they are also aware of the German government’s hostilities towards European Jewry.

Over four decades, Winston Churchill’s views on Zionism and Jews varied greatly. Without knowing his long held personal beliefs or the policies he adopted while the Jewish state developed, and only reading this speech, one would not know that he was a political opportunist and certainly not a “Gentile Zionist.”

Jewish Agency head David Ben-Gurion emphasizes that a Jewish state will be a place for all, including Arabs, and calls for Jews to be better educated about the elements of a state.

In New York, urging American (Jewish) support, Ben-Gurion proclaims the eventual establishment of a Jewish state.

A key figure in the Jewish Agency's political department, Moshe Shertok (later Sharett) argues for a Jewish commonwealth/state in Palestine. Pragmatically he realizes Arabs in Palestine oppose the Jewish presence, yet he rejects a potential binational Arab-Jewish state.

In four days of sharply presented testimony and debate, the House evaluated the pros and cons of whether to endorse Jewish immigration to Palestine. Pressure from the Executive Branch not to pass such a resolution was heeded. According to Chief of Staff George Marshall “such a resolution would have adverse effects on the Moslem world.” This was the same argument that the State Department used in trying but failing to persuade President Truman in 1947 not to vote in favor of Palestine’s partition into Arab and Jewish states. The debate in the Congress took place more than a year before World War II ended in Europe. Fear of Arab state retaliation against the US never materialized because the US endorsed Jewish immigration to Palestine and a two state solution.

This analysis was undertaken and written at the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem by Jewish observers of the Arab riots and rebellion that took place between April 1936 and early 1939.

Before ending his term in 1944 as Palestine's High Commissioner, Sir Harold MacMichael suggested the partition of Palestine, "Jews and Arabs alike would enjoy the possession of their own respective territories, the former protected by international guarantees for their security, and the latter relieved from fear of further encroachments."

Steady disintegration of Palestinian Arab society from 1945-1949 is detailed by five Arab and non-Arab historians citing local social cleavages, economic impoverishment, fear, indebtedness, and political dysfunction.

Moshe Sharett urges the British and Americans to open Palestine to unimpeded Jewish immigration from Europe.

Gerda Luft's, "Cultural Life in Palestine," is representative of the dozens of excellent analyses of Jewish life and politics in Palestine/Israel and the world located in the annual Palestine Yearbooks, later the Israel Yearbook, published from 1945 forward.

Circumventing the existing law on prohibition of land sales to Jews, Palestinian Arabs are found selling lands regularly and furtively to Zionists.

From the beginning of the Palestine Mandate in 1920, Arabs in Palestine opposed Zionism; Arab states and leaders joined the opposition to Zionism in the 1930s. After WWII, Arab states were vehement in their opposition to Zionism, though the merits of their arguments were genuine, Arab leaders were more interested in controlling the land of Palestine than in the Palestinians themselves.

With the British spending local revenue on strategic needs — ports, roads and communication systems — scant funds were devoted to education in the Mandate. Already baked into diasporic habits, the Jewish community raced forward in educating its own in Palestine to inculcate penetrating attachments to Palestine as the Jewish national home. Arab youth literacy ran in place, with separatist education contributing mightily to communal divisions, as occurred simultaneously in the economic and geospatial spheres.

The report of a joint U.S.-British committee on the situation in Palestine and the fate of European Jewish refugees fails to offer solutions the British government will accept but does deliver vital data and insights on the situation between Arabs and Jews in the Land of Israel.

The JNF estimated that up to 250,000 dunams (a dunam was a quarter of an acre) could be purchased if funds were available despite Arab opposition to sales and a steep rise in prices. By then, Jews owned 1.6 million dunams of land, with more than half of Palestine not owned by anyone.

These Foreign Relations of the United States collections provide an ongoing, in-depth view at issues and conflict in the Middle East and the U.S.-Israel relationship from 1947 to 1978.

Fearing Communist penetration of the Eastern Mediterranean, Truman at the beginning of the Cold War defines the region as a sphere of US national interest.

Despite an officially anti-Zionist stance, the Soviet Union, hoping to adopt Israel as a Soviet proxy, takes a pragmatic stance and supports the U.N. partition plan of Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish states.

Published by the British Administration of Palestine, this summary emphasizes attempts at impartiality in governing the Mandate. It notes that in 1922, the Jewish community already possessed 'national' characteristics, while the Arab community’s composition was sociologically and economically divided and to a large degree impoverished by the war.

The Status-Quo Agreement is an understanding reached between David Ben-Gurion, then the chairman of the Jewish Agency Executive, and the religious parties in the period before Israel became a state.

The last of 23 volumes of Chaim Weizmann’s Letters summarized wonderfully by Aaron Klieman, recalls the Israeli first president’s views of those fateful years for Zionism and Israel from 1947-1952. Chaim Weizmann died at his home in Rehovot on 9 November 1952, shortly before his 78th birthday. All of the letters read together, provide ring side seat to Zionism as an idea to the reality of the Jewish state.

Earlier in 1947, Great Britain turned the future of the Palestine Mandate over to the newly established United Nations. Then in August 1947, the UN suggested that establishing an Arab and Jewish state with a federal union would be the best solution for the communal unrest there.

The head of Arab League says Palestine may be lost in a confrontation with the Zionists, but emphatically states that war is the Arab’s only option.

Loy Henderson, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, U.S. State Department, to U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall Writing two months before the U.S. voted at the United Nations in favor of Palestine's partition into Arab and Jewish states, Henderson voices profound dislike for Zionism and a Jewish state. He advocates for cultivating positive relations with Muslim and Arab states. He is one of many at the State Department at the time who saw Zionism as contrary to American national interests.

No document better reveals the hostility which most Arab leaders and Arab states had in 1947 for Zionism and for a possible Jewish state. The Saudi King notes "that US support for Zionists in Palestine is an unfriendly act directed against the Arabs." The King's views were totally supported by US State Department officials including Loy Henderson and George Kennan who advocated strongly against Truman's support of a Jewish state.

The UN recommended establishing Arab and Jewish states in Palestine, with an international regime for Jerusalem. Zionists were jubilant; Arab states and the Palestinians were indignant and rejected two state solution. No Arab state is established, Israel is in 1948

Irrefutable evidence shows Palestinian Arab collaboration with Zionists during the British Mandate greatly assisted Jewish state building. Cohen further asserts a general absence among Palestinians of a sense of national feeling, with loyalties instead tied to families, villages and other localities. Quite certainly without Palestinian Arab collaboration, Zionists would not have succeeded in building a nucleus for the Jewish state. Arabic newspapers in Palestine and British scrutiny show the constancy of the Arab population's engagement with the Zionists, and this included Arabs resident inside Palestine.

In March 1948, two months before Israel’s establishment, the US State Department sought to reverse the US vote in favor of partition for the creation of Arab and Jewish states in Palestine.

The Declaration recounts the Jewish connection to the Land of Israel, the birth of Zionism and U.N. recognition of a Jewish state’s legitimacy. It also promises that the state will be a democracy for all its citizens.

This 10-page report, written by the British Colonial and Foreign Office, along with the 1937 Peel (Royal) Commission Report, is one of the two best summaries of the British presence in Palestine.  Both are substantial in terms of content, detail and analyses; both were written from Britain’s perspective. Read these along with 1931 Census for Palestine to have a fuller grasp of the politics and the populations that shaped Britain’s Palestine’s administration from 1918-1948

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The Israel State Archives has collected government documents on the history of Israel's interactions with the Beta Israel through the first operations to facilitate their emigration from Ethiopia in the 1980s.

Subsequent to Israel's territorial successes from May 1948 forward, U.N. mediator Bernadotte is assassinated after suggesting smaller borders for Israel. He does not mention Palestinian Arabs in his interim report.

This draft spoke eloquently about protecting individual, religious, and civil rights for all. Instead individual civil rights in Israel were protected by a series of Basic Laws.

The resolution states that refugees “wishing to return to their homes and live at peace (with Israel) should do so or compensation be paid.” Israel opposes the idea because it jeopardizes Israel as a majority-Jewish state.

One of four agreements Israel signed in 1949 with Arab neighbors, it does not end the state of war between Israel and Egypt. They do not sign a treaty until 1979.

Upon admission to the U.N., Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett said, "It was the consummation of a people's transition from political anonymity to clear identity, from inferiority to equal status, from mere passive protest to active responsibility, from exclusion to membership in the family of nations."

Sharett gives an overview of Israeli foreign policy, key issues, and relationships with UN and Arab states.

Jews worldwide are given the right to come to Israel and become citizens.

Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion and American Jewish Committee President Jacob Blaustein express a compromise in the American Jewish-Israel relationship: American Jews are excited and proud of Israel's birth as a state but owe Israel no allegiance, and Israel does not speak for anyone but Israeli citizens.

Celebrating the creation and survival of the State of Israel, the yearbook provides a thorough history of the Zionist movement from the First Zionist Congress in 1897 to independence in 1948.

This report submitted to the United Nations at the end of 1951 notes that “some one million Jews have become the victims of accelerated antiSemitism” since 1948 in the Muslim countries of the Arab League and North Africa, “communities which have existed for thousands of years.” The report analyzes the situation for Jews overall and explains restrictions and oppressive measures country by country.

With crisp analysis, Haganah Commander Yigal Allon, later a Prime Minister of Israel attributes Israel's successes to multiple factors including the absence of a centralized Arab command, limited Arab military training, underestimating the potential fighting capabilities of local Arabs, and Israel's success in integrating its citizens into the war effort.

In an impassioned Knesset speech, Menachem Begin staunchly opposes accepting $1.5 billion in German reparations for Jewish deaths during WWII. No price, he believes, can be put on the lives lost.

Israel's first prime minister was a prolific writer. In this excerpt of a 50-page document, he notes that the Jewish nation’s DNA included relentless challenges marked by dispersal, ostracism and hatred by many people. Despite these adversities, Israel’s establishment symbolizes a remarkable victory against all odds — a culmination of the Jewish people’s tenacity and unyielding spirit. The state and Zionism were not remotely close to being finished, nor having succeeded in the quest for the Jewish people’s normalization.

Israeli Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan’s eulogy in 1956 for an Israeli guard murdered at a kibbutz next to the Gaza Strip affirms absolute requirements for being an Israeli: vigilance, determination, and not to be fooled by hollow claims for peace.

Further reinforcing the Truman Doctrine, the US President promises military or economic aid to any Middle Eastern country resisting Communist aggression.

In response to President Eisenhower’s demand that Israel leave Sinai, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion provides a detailed history of Israel at the UN and Egypt’s denial to Israel of use of the Suez Canal. He stresses Egyptian “injustice, discrimination, hostility, and boycott” imposed on Israel.

Ben-Gurion elegantly connects modern Israel from messianic redemption to Zionism, building the country through labor and immigration, with dual needs to remain actively linked to the Jewish diaspora and Jewish values through education.

With no constitution, citizen rights and government responsibilities are stated in 14 laws. The Judiciary is covered in the Seventh Basic Law, February 1984.

Palestine Liberation Organization seeks Israel’s destruction through armed struggle. It retains this stated policy until December 1988.

Ten days before the start of the Six-Day War, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser declares that Egypt, Syria and other Arab states intend to destroy Israel.

With tensions on its borders, Eshkol tries to reassure Israeli public. Instead he gives a “painfully faltering” speech. Popular and party disgruntlement follow, opening the way for Eshkol to turn over the Defense Ministry two days later to General Moshe Dayan.

Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser asserts that the conflict with Israel is not over access to the Gulf of Aqaba but the very existence of Israel; Egypt’s foes are Britain and the United States, which support Israel.

The Israeli ambassador to the United Nations delivers a detailed outline of events that will lead to war two days later.

The Israel State Archives' “The Six Day War Files” includes Cabinet and Security Cabinet meeting transcripts that were classified for 50 years.

After the Israeli army swept through Sinai in four days, the Egyptian president acknowledges the success of Israel’s pre-emptive strike but blames the U.S. and Britain. Still, he takes responsibility for the Arab defeat and resigns.

Two days after the conclusion of the June 1967 War, Eshkol, recounts the series of events that led to war, the war itself and the immediate aftermath. He reaches out to Arab states for peace seeking a path to peace with her belligerent neighbors. A week later, Israel will quietly messages Cairo and Damascus through the US, hat Israel seeks an end to the conflict. No answers are received.

President Johnson’s remarks became the philosophical outline for UN Resolution 242 passed in November 1967. Core to his view was that Israel would not need to return to the pre-1967 war borders, and that the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all states in the region should be protected.

Following the conclusion of the June 1967 War, the Israeli government sent word to Egypt and Syria seeking peace plan that was intended to jumpstart a peace process with Israel’s belligerent neighbors, Egypt and Syria. The messages were sent through the US, but no response was apparently received.

After the June 1967 war, the Israeli government sent word through the United States to Egypt and Syria seeking to jump-start a peace process. Apparently no response was received.

Receiving an honorary doctorate from the Hebrew University after the conclusion of the June 1967 War, Rabin delivers a speech on behalf of Israel’s entire military. He highlights the harsh realities of war yet concentrates on commending the extraordinary efforts of Israel’s armed forces.

Yigal Allon's plan for handling the areas captured from Jordan during the just-completed Six-Day War reflects Israel’s previous border vulnerability and seeks a West Bank arrangement that is not a strategic or geographic threat.

Arab states declare “no peace, no negotiation, no recognition” with Israel after their collective defeat in the June 1967 War.

Resolution 242 calls for Israeli withdrawal from unspecified captured territories in return for the right of all states to live in peace. It does not call for a full withdrawal. It is the basis for treaties with Egypt (1979) and Jordan (1994) and for PLO recognition of Israel (1993).

The law authorizes appointed Israeli panels to investigate matters of public concern and state interest. These independent bodies are among Israeli democracy’s most trusted institutions, but there is not mechanism in the law to require their creation.

Without any consultation with Jerusalem, Israel rejects US proposal for full withdrawal.

One of Israel’s greatest writers, Natan Alterman, reminded Israel’s accusers in 1969 that well into the 20th century the Palestinians did not even understand themselves as a separate people with a distinctive national identity marking them off from other Arabs. His argument, if framed as a question, might be formulated along these lines: If no one else, not least the Palestinians’ ancestors, saw their distinctive nation in Ottoman Palestine, how can the Zionists be blamed for not seeing one either? Thus, to fault the Zionists for failing to see what was not yet visible to anyone else, including the Palestinians, is to fault them not for suffering from blindness, but for lacking clairvoyance.

This volume of the U.S. government's "Foreign Relations of the United States" series provides foreign policy documents on the Arab-Israeli conflict before, during and after the October 1973 war.

October 6, 2023, was the 50th anniversary of the outbreak of the October 1973 war. Six months prior, Egyptian President Sadat sent his national security adviser to meet with Secretary of State Kissinger to determine whether the U.S. would engage Egypt and Israel in serious mediation for a Sinai agreement, or a series of them, all focused on Israeli withdrawal and gradual acceptance of Israel. Kissinger did not take Sadat’s overtures seriously. Would American action then have avoided the October 1973 war? All informed analyses say no.

With less than three dozen Israeli settlements in the territories taken in the June War, the proposal is not for a vast settlement increase, but for economic, infrastructure, and industrial development of the areas.

In carrying out research in the 1990s for Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace, Routledge, 1999, I undertook 84 interviews with individuals who participated in the diplomacy.

The October 1973 war broke the logjam over whether diplomacy could unfold to kick off Arab-Israeli negotiations. Sadat used the 1973 war as an engine to harness American horsepower. In that he succeeded because U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger saw Sadat’s leaning to Washington not only as a chance to begin useful negotiations, but also of great significance to weaning the Egyptian president away from Moscow.

U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger failed to persuade Syrian President Assad to attend the December 1973 Geneva Middle East Peace Conference. Assad saw the proposed conference, which it was, a ruse to cover up a "pre-cooked" Israeli-Egyptian arrangement. Assad wanted no part of implicitly supporting any agreement where Israel's legitimacy might be enhanced.

The U.S. mediates an agreement separating forces in Sinai after the October 1973 war. Egyptian and Israeli generals will negotiate additional details.

The US promises to implement an Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement and have the Suez Canal cleared. Israel sees eventual repopulation of Suez Canal cities as a sign that Egypt will not go to war again soon.

An Israeli commission of inquiry assigns responsibility to military leaders for failures before and during the Yom Kippur War. Prime Minister Meir and Defense Minister Dayan avoid direct blame but soon resign.

On the Golan Heights, Israel agrees to a limited withdrawal, and the United Nations places forces between the Syrian and Israeli armies. With few exceptions this border remains quiet for more than 40 years.

President Ford promises that the US will give “weight” to any future Israeli peace agreement with Syria that Israel should remain in the Golan Heights.

Cairo and Jerusalem agree to additional Sinai withdrawals, demilitarized zones, limited force zones and, importantly, placement of US civilians in Sinai to monitor observance of agreement.

The US promises coordination with Israel on resumed negotiations, not to negotiate or recognize the PLO until it recognizes Israel’s right to exist, and accepts UNSC Resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973).

Led by USSR and Arab states, Zionism is labeled as racist; the resolution is revoked in 1991.

For the first time a US State Department official states the “legitimate interests of the Palestinian Arabs must be taken into account in the negotiating of an Arab-Israeli peace.”

Outlining an Arab-Israeli settlement, the Brookings report calls for Israel to withdraw to “almost the pre-June War borders” and for “extensive Palestinian autonomy.” The Carter administration embraces the report for its foreign policy.

With candor, Israeli Foreign Minister Allon tells Secretary of State Vance that the Israeli Labor government would under no circumstances negotiate with the PLO until it gave up terrorism, recognized UNSC 242, and unequivocally accepted Israel’s right to exist. Only in 1993, did the PLO accept these premises, Sixteen years had then passed while Israel built settlements virtually without restraint in the territories.

This first Carter-Rabin meeting was unpleasant at best. Rabin would not turn over Israel's negotiating prerogatives to the US; Carter publicly told Israel that it might have to return to the June 1967 borders. Carter said Rabin was like a "dead fish." and Rabin said that he felt 'cornered by Carter." His administration was interested in carving out the West Bank for Palestinian political expression even before the PLO was prepared to accept Israeli legitimacy. And Israel was not prepared to withdraw from the West Bank, a position also held by Menachem Begin.

Carefully stated, Carter says that there should be a homeland for the Palestinian refugees. He is the first US president to assert the need for a place for the Palestinians and for Israel’s right to exist in peace.

In their first meeting, Anwar Sadat and Jimmy Carter have a vividly detailed exchange about negotiations between Israel and Arab parties, particularly Egypt.

When the Carter Administration entered office in 1977, an early foreign policy priority was to kick-start Middle East negotiations. In this Policy Review Committee Meeting, Carter’s staff proposed a negotiating outcome that would pass through a conference, including the withdrawal of Israel’s forces to almost the 1967 borders, bringing the PLO into talks as Palestinian representatives, all the while seeking to uphold Israel's security requirements.

This meeting was the only one between U.S. President Carter and Syrian President Assad during the Carter administration. Carter wanted to learn Assad’s requirements for an agreement with Israel. Assad doubted that the Saudis would join this process. In the end, Assad made it clear that he was not rushing into an agreement with Israel, even if asked by the United States. Carter acknowledged knowing little about the Palestinian refugee issue and said the U.S. was committed to the security of Israel.

Prime Minister-elect Begin rebukes President Carter’s assertion that Israel will need to withdraw from almost all the lands Israel secured in the June 1967 war, especially Jerusalem and the West Bank. Begin is adamant opposed to dealing with the PLO. Begin refuses to relinquish Israeli decision-making to US preferences or dictates. These fundamental policy disagreements will remain unresolved between Begin and Carter for the duration of Carter’s presidency, and years after.

Hamilton Jordan, Carter's chief political adviser, warned the president to halt the administration's anti-Israeli actions. Nonetheless, they continued to diminish Carter's support among American Jews through the 1980 re-election campaign.

Begin tells Carter that Judea, Samaria (the West Bank) and the Gaza Strip will not be placed under foreign sovereignty; likewise, these areas will not be annexed, leaving them open for possible negotiations.

After his surprise electoral victory in May, Prime Minister Menachem Begin traveled to Washington to establish a rapport with President Carter. While this initial meeting was cordial, each met the other’s stubbornness, a characteristic that would keep their relationship respectful but acrid for years to come.

The Romanian president told Menachem Begin that Egyptian President Sadat was interested in negotiations with the Israelis. This secret visit took place three weeks before Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan met secretly with Egyptian Vice President Hasan Tuhami in Morocco.

Unknown to the Carter administration and one month before it issued the US-Soviet Declaration to convene an international Middle East Peace Conference, Prime Minister Begin tells the cabinet that he learned from the Rumanian president that Sadat wishes to have Israeli and Egyptian representatives meet in secret talks. That bi-lateral Dayan -Tuhami meeting takes place on September 16. Begin refers to advanced drafts of proposed treaties between Israel and each Arab state; he presents details about Rumanian Jewish immigration to Israel.

Israeli and Egyptian representatives meet secretly in Morocco to test intentions for direct talks between their leaders, with details of the meetings unknown to the United States.

The vast gulf in US and Israeli positions about Palestinian self-determination, the degree of withdrawal from the West Bank, and future borders is precisely stated. A year later at the end of the Camp David negotiations, Israeli and US views had not changed at all.

In two meetings at the White House, the Syrian foreign minister insists on the PLO's presence at a regional peace conference and wins U.S. support for some kind of Palestinian "entity."

Naively, the Carter Administration believes that a conference with the USSR would start comprehensive negotiations; instead, the fear of Moscow’s engagement helps drive direct Egyptian-Israeli talks.

After brutally frank and caustic meetings between Israeli Foreign Minister Dayan and President Carter, the US relents to Israeli demands that a peace conference be only an opening for direct talks.

Common to both the Labor Party and to Begin’s government was a fear that the US would pressure Israel into unwanted concessions and deny Israel its right to sovereign decision-making. It was a concern that Dayan expressed in this October 1977 meeting, and one that he would articulate on several occasions during the Camp David negotiations.

Begin welcomes Sadat’s bold initiative, seeking an end to the conflict with other Arab states through negotiated treaties. Begin invites other Arab leaders to negotiate as Sadat was doing.

Sadat tells the Israeli people and world that he seeks a just and durable peace, which is not a separate peace, between Israel and Egypt. He equates statehood for the Palestinians as their right to return.

Two weeks after Anwar Sadat's historic trip to Jerusalem, Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan and Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister Hassan Tuhami meet in Morocco under the auspices of King Hassan II for a frank discussion of what they want out of bilateral negotiations.

Five weeks after Egyptian President Anwar Sadat flew to Jerusalem in November 1977, to accelerate Egyptian – Israeli negotiations, Begin brought to President Jimmy Carter, Israel’s response to Sadat’s peace initiative: political autonomy for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. No Palestinian state was considered.

Having made human rights a central pillar of his foreign policy, Carter nonetheless seemingly ignored the abuses the Shah of Iran imposed upon his own people. Carter's unctuous praise for the Shah at this state dinner angered Iranians in general, the clerical regime that replaced the Shah in 1979, resulting in negative consequences for Carter as he went into the 1980 presidential election.

As part of a joint statement, President Carter makes promises regarding US’ role in coming Political-Military Committee Talks in Cairo and Jerusalem. Likewise presenting a four-point formula for resolving the conflict, these statements contribute to US-Israeli tensions.

After a year in office, the Carter administration’s initiative to achieve a comprehensive Middle East peace between Israel and her Arab neighbors had stalled. At this White House meeting, Dayan reviewed Israel’s concerns about the West Bank and Brzezinski criticized Begin’s autonomy plan for the Palestinians. Begin and Carter’s mutual dislike over policy decisions continued to rise.

These six documents reveal the advanced state of Washington's success in finding compromise language and principles for achieving Egyptian and Israeli agreement on bilateral matters and about Palestinian West Bank self-rule (Begin's ideas), though significant gaps remain before the Camp David Summit.

The Israeli delegation at Camp David discusses a meeting among Menachem Begin, Anwar Sadat and Jimmy Carter at which Sadat presented a peace framework that Begin called "the most extreme document that the Egyptians have ever written"

Early during the Camp David summit, Moshe Dayan, Ezer Weizman and other Israeli officials address resettlement and payment of 1967 and 1948 Palestinian refugees and Israeli military redeployment on the eastern and western borders, while Zbigniew Brzezinski, Cyrus Vance and other Americans emphasize Palestinian sovereignty.

This meeting between Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and the Israeli delegation exemplified the injection of US interests and the application of concerted diplomatic pressure on Israel. The Israeli delegation at Camp David repeatedly refused the Carter administration’s vigorous efforts to introduce new formulations that might ultimately result in a Palestinian state.

In this meeting, the contents of which have not been released by the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) but are available from the Israel State Archives (ISA), Begin clearly committed that “perhaps one military settlement” in the Jordan Valley would be established during the three months of the treaty negotiations. The extraordinarily contentious public dispute on the settlements would mar the diplomatic success of the Camp David Accords and add tension to the already fraught Carter-Begin relationship.

U.S. and Israeli officials at Camp David spend a session focused on the land-for-peace U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 and how it applies to the West Bank, Jordan, Israel and the Palestinians. Appropriate for a discussion over 242, whose application depends on the absence of the word "the," the officials argue over using boundary, border, line, borderline or something else.

With President Carter mediating, Sadat and Begin agree to two outlines: a framework for a treaty between them and to define Palestinian “autonomy,” not self-determination or a state for them.

On the last day of negotiations at Camp David, President Carter asked Israel to accept the US position that Jerusalem was occupied territory; Dayan shot back in vigorous opposition, "if we had known that you would declare your position on Jerusalem, we would not have come here. This is the first time that we are confronted with an American position and specifically on the most sensitive issue. All your positions with regards to settlements are insignificant compared to our confrontation on the issue of Jerusalem."

Begin agrees to halt settlements construction only for the duration of the peace treaty negotiations, not until Palestinian autonomy is applied. Carter erroneously believes that Begin made a promise to halt settlements.

This document is the only known official written transcript of the Begin-Carter discussion held at the end of the 1978 Camp David negotiations about any moratorium on Israel's future settlement building. This record shows that Begin made no mention of a moratorium on settlement building for longer than three months. However, President Carter publicly, and Secretary of State Vance, in his memoirs, Hard Choices disagreed, believing the time mentioned was five years. For the remainder of Carter's presidency, and for the rest of his post-presidency, the 'building of Israeli settlements' became a key point of contention in shaping his relationship with Israel.

Begin summarizes in great detail the contents and the political implications of the recently signed Camp David Accords. He reiterated Israel's continued presence in Jerusalem, per its June 1967 Law, and clarified the terms used in the agreements.

Dayan made the case to the knesset that it should vote in favor of the Camp David Accords stipulating why doing so would be in Israel's long term interest. He stated specifically that there was no promise for a Palestinian state, IDF forces would remain in the West Bank, negotiations for a peace treaty would continue, and these agreements were signed by the President of Egypt and the President of the US.

Embedded in the September 17, 1978 Camp David Accords were broad outlines for an Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty and a Framework for Palestinian autonomy. The details of both remained to be negotiated. Yet, obstacles to implementation of the Accords appeared almost immediately.

In an unprecedented presidential political gamble, President Carter meets Prime Minister Begin and then President Sadat to tie up loose ends for an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, signed two weeks later. During the trip, he delivers the first Knesset address by a U.S. president.

Nine days before the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli treaty, U.S. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud carry out an extraordinarily frank conversation. It includes bilateral relations, common fears of regional turbulence and Anwar Sadat’s estrangement from other Arab leaders.

Carefully sandwiched between Jimmy Carter’s high-risk visit to Egypt and Israel and the signing of those countries' peace treaty, the Carter administration allows the U.N. Security Council to deplore Israeli settlement building and demographic changes in Jerusalem.

If Egypt breaches the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty, the US will enhance its presence in the area, provide military and economic supplies to Israel, and vote against any UN resolution contrary to the treaty.

Signed sixteen months after Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem, it calls for establishment of diplomatic relations, staged Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, and American security arrangements to support the bilateral treaty.

This was the second UNSC Resolution within four months supported by the Carter administration condemning Israel's settlement building in the territories. It too greatly angered the Israeli government and American supporters of Israel.

Showing its public opposition to Israeli actions in the lands taken in the June 1967 war, an area that the Carter Administration wanted reserved for Palestinian self-rule, it 'strongly deplores' Israel's settlement policies. Passage of the resolution three weeks prior to the New York and Connecticut presidential primaries, cause many Jewish voters to vote in favor of Ted Kennedy and not for Carter, helping to splinter the Democratic Party.

It calls for “recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, a just solution to the Palestinian problem, the right to self-determination, [and] for PLO association to the negotiations.”

After the September 1978 Camp David Accords ended, the Carter administration diligently tried but failed to persuade Jordan's King Hussein to be part of the follow-on negotiations over Palestinian autonomy. Carter felt Hussein was obstructionist; Hussein did not believe in 1978 that the US could halt Israeli settlement building as promised then. Hussein was correct. He also believed that Palestinian Autonomy might have a negative impact on many Palestinians living in his kingdom. Hussein was skeptical of the US capacity to negotiate for his national interests. At the same time, privately, Egypt's Sadat was not displeased that the Jordanians remained out of favor with the US, and away from any negotiations that would detract from implementation of Israel's promised full withdrawal from Sinai, per their 1979 Treaty. In 1988, Hussein stepped away from the West Bank’s future; in 1994, Jordan signed a peace treaty with Israel.

Failing to account for the effects on his re-election hopes, President Jimmy Carter for the second of three times in 1980 lets the U.N. Security Council enact a resolution criticizing Israeli behavior beyond the Green Line.

The United States abstains on a Security Council resolution declaring Israel's Basic Law on Jerusalem to be in violation of international law.

Prime Minister Menachem Begin argues for the return of Rafah to Egypt; the greater purpose is implementation of the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty, which also meant Israel''s withdrawal from settlements in Sinai near Rafah. Egypt in treaty negotiations with Israel, did not want to have the Gaza Strip again under their administration as they had between 1949 until after the June 1967 War

It calls for building a mutual security relationship and for enhancing strategic cooperation to deter Soviet threats to the region. Establishment of a consultation framework is a key to the agreement.

The United States endorses the application of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 to the West Bank and Gaza, seeks Palestinian control over land and resources, and wants the territories to be affiliated with Jordan.

Areas of bilateral political and military cooperation are noted to fend off Soviet involvement in the Middle East, to assist Israel in building the Lavi aircraft, to support an independent Lebanon and to promote Arab-Israeli negotiations.

The deal to mutually phase out tariffs on manufactured goods over a decade is the first free-trade agreement for the United States and the second for Israel, after one reached with a precursor to the European Union.

The Jordanian king and Israeli Labor Party leaders secretly outline a plan to convene an international conference to move Israeli-Palestinian talks forward through a conference format, but Likud opposition leaders squash the idea.

The agreement affirms the close relationship between the U.S. and Israel based on common goals, celebrates the 3-year-old U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement, and institutes multiple regular meetings between Israeli and U.S. officials.

Jordan's King Hussein made a strategic decision to disassociate administratively from the West Bank, leaving it to focus Jordanian national identity on only the east bank of the Jordan River. The PLO subsequently negotiated with Israel to rule over some of these lands, as codified in the 1993 Oslo Accords, but no Palestinian state was promised.

Since its inception in 1988, Hamas has been crystal clear about its total opposition to Zionism and Israel. It opposes any kind of negotiations or agreements that recognize Israel as a reality, and its more extreme spokesmen regularly incite or celebrate the killing of Jews.

As a militant Islamic Palestinian national organization, Hamas believes that Israel is illegitimate and should be destroyed through Jihad. Hamas opposes all recognition and negotiation with Israel and opposes PLO/PA leaders who have negotiated and collaborated with Israel from time to time. The Hamas-PA competition severely fragments the Palestinian political community.

PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat issues a declaration with five American Jewish leaders in an effort to meet U.S. conditions for dialogue and thus strengthen his position as the leader of the Palestinian national movement.

Secretary of State James A. Baker III brings a realistic and prescient vision of Arab-Israeli peace negotiations and U.S. mediation to AIPAC early in the George H.W. Bush presidency.

U.S. Secretary of State James Baker warns that the United States will not accept Saddam Hussein’s erasure of Kuwait a month earlier. Baker says intimidation and force will not be tolerated in the post-Cold War world.

As part of the preparations for the Madrid peace conference in October 1991, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker drafts a memorandum of agreement between the U.S. and Israel regarding the particulars of resuming the Arab-Israeli peace process. He opens by reiterating that the intention of the negotiations is to achieve a regional peace agreement based on U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

After the 1991 Gulf War, the US orchestrates a conference with Israel, multiple Arab states, and Palestinians participating; the conference leads to bilateral and multilateral negotiations.

The U.N. General Assembly overwhelming reverses a Soviet-driven decision 16 years earlier to declare Zionism a form of racism.

Four days before signing the Oslo Accords, the PLO and Israel recognize each other. Israel’s Rabin worries about the growth of Hamas influence, thus elevates the PLO through international recognition.

Arafat offers gratitude to President Clinton for hosting this historic event, expressing hopes that the agreement will end a century of suffering and usher in peace coexistence and equal fights. He acknowledges the courage of the people of Israel to seek the determination to build peace. While advocating joint responsibility of Palestinians and Israelis to enforce the agreement, history shows that over the next decade, Arafat does not clamp down on violent attacks against Israelis.

Clinton expresses gratitude to those who brought about the possibilities of reconciling Israeli and Palestinian aspirations, and acknowledges past leaders, Menachem Begin, Anwar Sadat, Jimmy Carter, and George Bush for advancing the sides toward this moment of signing the Accords on Interim Palestinian Self-Government. Over the next two decades, funds pour into the West Bank and Gaza Strip and elections for a self governing authority are held, but autocratic rule and financial mismanagement prevail, stymying along with other reasons, successful Palestinian self-rule.

As a lifetime soldier-politician, Rabin acknowledges that the signing of the Declaration of Principles was profoundly difficult, and yet there is a yearning to end the cycle of violence and engage in reconciliation with the Palestinians. Drawing inspiration from Jewish tradition, he stresses the timeliness of pursuing peace and prays for a new era in the Middle East. 

In September 2023, thirty years after the historic signing of the Oslo Accords, there is occasion to review Prime Minister Rabin’s understanding of them. I assembled this collection years ago from Daily Reports- Near East and South Asia, 1993-1995. Two short items about Rabin’s views are also found or linked here. Rabin provided a summary of his views of the Accords in a Knesset speech in October 5, 1995. Some of Rabin’s reasons for signing the Accords are also provided in Yehuda Avner’s The Prime Ministers.

Negotiated through the Norwegians, the Oslo Accords call for limited Palestinian rule in some of the territories but do not call for a Palestinian state or an end to settlements.

Forty-one documents compiled by the Israel State Archives illuminate the negotiations beginning in September 1993 that produced an Israel-Jordan peace treaty in October 1994.

Foreign Minister Shimon Peres supports the Oslo Accords, opposes a Palestinian state and rejects Israel's role in the Gaza Strip as the enforcer of security — all views that have continuing relevance for Gaza.

An Israel State Archives document collection shows how Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization negotiated under the Oslo Accords to achieve an agreement in May 1994 on Palestinian autonomy in Jericho and the Gaza Strip.

Jordan becomes the second Arab country after Egypt (1979) to sign a peace treaty ending the state of war with Israel. The Treaty addresses boundary demarcations, water sharing, police and security cooperation, environmental issues, border crossings, administration of Muslim holy sites and other issues.

A day after the signing of the Jordan-Israel peace treaty and hours before addressing the Knesset, U.S. President Bill Clinton meets with his Syrian counterpart, Hafez al-Assad, in Damascus and expresses optimism that Syria will be part of a comprehensive Middle East peace. Assad continues to insist on the full return of the Golan Heights.

In only the second Knesset address by a U.S. president, Bill Clinton hails the treaty Jordan and Israel signed the previous day as part of a peaceful wave sweeping the region, including the year-old Oslo Accords and soon a likely treaty with Syria.

This was the fourth Palestinian-Israeli Agreement signed that broadly extended Palestinian self-governing arrangements throughout the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. No Palestinian state was promised, essentially only putting substance on the Palestinian autonomy agreement that Menachem Begin signed with Anwar Sadat in the 1978 Camp David Accords.

Days before his assassination, Yitzhak Rabin explains that he accepted the Oslo Accords and shook Yasser Arafat's hand because the PLO represented the last hope for a secular Palestinian nationalism amid the rise of Hamas.

In 1995, Senators Robert Dole and Jon Kyl introduced the Jerusalem Embassy Act to move the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem. The bill was adopted by an overwhelming majority in both houses of Congress; it provided Presidential authorization to effectively delay the embassy move every six months, if deemed necessary for U.S. national security interests.

The Israeli investigation concludes that Yigal Amir is Rabin’s assassin. The Commission does not assess the impact on the assassin of the vicious language directed at Rabin for signing the Oslo Accords.

President Clinton and Prime Minister Peres agree to deepen cooperation between their countries through regular consultation in all economic, political, military spheres.

With Israeli-Palestinian talks in a hapless state, President Clinton rejuvenates them. In the Arafat-Netanyahu agreement Israel shares Hebron, with the CIA playing a role in West Bank security.

This is the third (1971 and 1985) and most extensive trade agreement signed between Israel and the EC/EU, emphasizing that more than half of all Israeli exports are to Europe. Virtually every conceivable area of sharing and exchange is noted in the agreement.

After failing to have PLO leader Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak reach an understanding at Camp David in mid-2000, President Bill Clinton offers a U.S. view of a final-status agreement near the end of his term.

In the midst of severe Palestinian-Israeli clashes, a committee led by former U.S. Sen. George Mitchell concludes, as had many previous investigations, that the two communities fear and want to live separately from each other. From the report flows the EU-U.N.-U.S. commitment to a two-state solution suggested in the 2003 Roadmap for Peace.

CIA Director George Tenet proposes a cease-fire to stop vicious Palestinian-Israeli violence that carries on for four more years. The plan seeks to restore Palestinian-Israeli security cooperation, end incitement, arrest militants and establish mechanisms for accountability through the U.S.

This is the first U.N. resolution to call for “two States, Israel and Palestine, to live side by side within secure and recognized borders.”

From an Arab summit, the initiative is revised several times since; it calls for normalization of relations with Israel, Israel’s withdrawal to the 1967 lines, but states an imprecise resolution of the refugee issue.

President Bush castigates PLO leader Arafat for support of terrorism and condemns Palestinian groups that “seek Israel’s destruction.” He also suggests that Israel economically support a viable Palestinian state.

As a negotiating plan it seeks an end to the conflict with reciprocal performance objectives. Israel accepts the plan with some reservations; Hamas rejects it out of hand. The plan is not enacted.

The findings of the Or Commission on the October 2000 clashes between Arab and Jewish Israelis provide context to the response of Arab citizens to the May 2021 Israeli-Palestinian fighting.

In his speech at the annual Herziliya Conference, PM Sharon articulates his view that the Quartet’s 2003 Road Map for Peace “is the only political plan accepted by Israel, the Palestinians, the Americans and a majority of the international community. We are willing to proceed toward its implementation: two states Israel and a Palestinian State living side by side in tranquility, security and peace.”

President Bush outlines view of Palestinian-Israeli settlement with Israeli Prime Minister: two state solution, borders to take into account changes in territories since 1967 War, and refugee resettlement in a future Palestinian state.

Prime Minister Sharon unilaterally withdrew Israeli military and civilian forces from the Gaza Strip in August 2005. Sharon sought to ensure Israel’s Jewish and democratic essence by getting out of the lives of the Palestinians. Instead Hamas used the territory to kill Jews and degrade Israel morally. Two decades later what would Sharon have said about trusting your neighbor unilaterally?

This U.N. resolution ends the 33-day Israel-Hezbollah war but fails to bring the Israel-Hezbollah conflict to conclusion. Hezbollah fighters are not prevented from reoccupying the Israeli-Lebanese border areas, leading to repeated cross-border attacks and ultimately intensification after the Hamas attack on Israel in October 2023.

Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh says in Tehran, "We shall never recognize the usurper Zionism government" and will "continue the jihadist movement until the liberation of Jerusalem."

Israeli Prime Minister Olmert and Palestinian leader Abbas meet near Washington to kick-start negotiations by implementing previous promises; the U.S. is to judge performance to see if a treaty can result. It does not.

Delivering the third address by a U.S. president to the Knesset, George W. Bush celebrates Israel's 60th birthday by emphasizing the enduring U.S.-Israel relationship based on shared values.

Barack Obama, while seeking to improve America’s image by urging an end to violence and stereotypes, emphasizes the need for a two-state Israeli-Palestinian solution as part of a reset of U.S. relations with the Muslim world. His advocacy of soft power distinguishes his administration from George W. Bush’s use of force. Nine years later, Donald Trump’s secretary of state, also in Cairo, heavily criticizes the Obama soft-power approach.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu endorses the evolution of a Palestinian state, stipulating that it must be demilitarized. He does not rule out a halt to settlement activity but says Palestinian refugees will not be resettled inside Israel's borders.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu gives five prerequisites for a peace with the Palestinians in call with the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations: mutual recognition, refugee resolution outside of Israel, end of conflict commitment, demilitarized Palestinian state, and guaranteed treaty or arrangement by the international community.

Focusing on the Arab Spring and Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, President Obama seeks democratic reform in the region and advocates two states for two peoples based on the 1967 lines with land swaps.

Defense Secretary Leon Panetta's speech is typical of high American officeholders in summarizing the U.S.-Israeli relationship. Panetta affirms an unshakable relationship, support for Israeli security and the need for a negotiating progress.

Netanyahu devotes the bulk of his speech to the Iranian threat, its desire to acquire a nuclear weapon and its sponsorship of terrorism internationally. He speaks proudly of the U.S.-Israeli relationship.

Vice President Joe Biden emphatically tells a rabbinic group in Atlanta, “unambiguously, were I an Israeli, were I a Jew, I would not contract out my security to anybody, even to a loyal, loyal friend like the United States.”

Building on a collaborative relationship of over 50 years, the US once again affirms its strategic commitments to Israel through an additional “Security Cooperation Act.” The agreement bolsters American military and financial aid to Israel.

In a major speech, Khalid Mishaal, the Chief of the Political Bureau of Hamas presents the organization's vision for liberation of all of Palestine, stating that it is national duty through Jihad and armed resistance. "Palestine, from its river to its sea, from its north to its south, is the land of the Palestinians; their homeland, and their legitimate right. We will not, in any way, recognize the legitimacy of the occupation. We do not recognize the legitimacy of the Israeli occupation of Palestine, in any way.

Biden's is seized by Iran's nuclear weapons program, and its continued support of terrorist organizations, like Hezbollah and Hamas; they endanger Israel and the world. Golda Meir told him. "Israel's secret weapon; it has no place to go."

In Jerusalem, Obama affirms the bonds in the U.S.-Israeli relationship, praises Israel’s democracy, and calls for Israelis to support a democratic Palestinian state and Palestinians to recognize Israel as a Jewish state.

Kerry reaffirms that the US-Israeli relationship as an “unshakable bond” and calls for a two-state solution. He promises that the US will “never allow” Iran to gain a nuclear weapon.

As the first Canadian Prime Minister to address the Knesset, Harper asserts Canada’s long-time friendship with Israel. Two days later, Canada signs a strategic cooperation agreement with Israel.

As part of the US negotiating team, Indyk enumerates why talks faltered after nine months. He asserts Israeli settlement activity undermined Palestinian trust for Israel. He also blames Palestinian indecision.

Hamas has opposed all agreements and cooperation which either the PLO or the Palestinian Authority have signed with Israel. “Hamas will never recognize Israel. This is a red line that cannot be crossed.

As it has in the past Hamas may accept a tahdi’a or calming down of tensions, or even a temporary truce or hudna, negotiated by a third party, but for it to accept Israel as a reality is totally contrary to its ideological outlook.

Just as al-Qaeda seeks the total destruction of western democracies, Hamas seeks Israel’s total demise. Since its inception in 1988, Hamas has been crystal clear about its opposition to Zionism and Israel.

The U.S. president announces a coalition of countries to fight the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. His plan calls for limited U.S. military action with supplies provided to others fighting on the ground.

Prosor accuses the UN of duplicity and hypocrisy because it is constantly critical of Israel, but not of radical Muslims for killing of Yazidis, Bahais, Kurds, and Christians.

The European Parliament calls for recognition of Palestinian statehood in the context for a negotiated two-state solution for Palestinians and Israelis; it outlines the political and geographic contours for a negotiated outcome.

Netanyahu praises the Obama administration for its support of Israel’s security, then roundly criticizes it for negotiating a deal with Iran that will not roll back its nuclear breakout time and for not demanding that before sanctions are lifted that Iran stop its support of terrorism and threats to wipe Israel off the map.

Under the deal between Iran and five world powers, Iran agreed to dismantle much of its nuclear program in exchange for billions of dollars of sanctions relief. Israel called the deal too lenient. On May 8, 2018, President Trump withdrew the U.S. from the JCPOA, calling it one of the "worst and most one-sided" agreements in U.S. history. Israel's objectives in attacking Iran in June 2025 focused on the same central features Israel argued a decade earlier were not sufficiently addressed in the JCPOA.

Vigorously promoting this Iran Deal as a viable way to block and limit Iran pathways to a bomb. While recognizing Israel’s intense trepidation to the deal, he forcefully claims that war remains the only alternative to accepting this agreement, or to any changes to the agreement.

Netanyahu reproaches the international community for supporting the Iran deal, the UN for its deafening silence against threats to Israel, and, against Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas for promising to cancel all agreements with Israel.

Kerry states five major objectives for US foreign policy in the Middle East: mobilize partners to defeat ISIS, work diplomatically to end the civil war in Syria, keep it from destabilizing friendly nearby countries, monitor Iranian adherence to the nuclear deal, and seek a two-state solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Claiming that Israel employs a double legal standard in the West Bank, US Ambassador Dan Shapiro receives a harsh rebuke for his remarks from Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu; Obama administration continues to chide Israel for its management of the West Bank.

U.S. National Security Adviser Susan Rice presented the Obama administration’s two-pronged outlook toward Israel: strong and unwavering American administration support for Israel’s long-term security and emphatic opposition to continued Israeli settlement activities.

The US promises Israel $38 billion in military aid over a decade, the assistance promised despite Jerusalem and Washington periodically differing over matters relating to Iran and the Palestinians.

With less than a month left in the Obama administration, the U.S. abstains on a Security Council resolution that blames Israel for the stalled peace process, lambastes Israeli settlements and repeatedly calls East Jerusalem occupied territory.

With exasperating passion, Kerry lashes out at Israel for its settlements construction as the major barrier to a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Two months into her Senate position, Harris promised "to do everything in my power to ensure broad and bipartisan support for Israel's security and right to self-defense." She endorsed the 10 year, $38 billion US military aid package to Israel while strongly backing (seven years before October 2023) a two-state Palestinian-Israeli solution."

The general principles are restated as they are in the 1988 founding Hamas Charter, jihad is the means to liberate Palestine, with an important notable addition, that these principles include 'no recognition of the Zionist entity,' for their point of view a terrible PLO recognition in September 1993. This document also restated the Palestinian right of return to all of Palestine defined as from the Jordan River on the east to the Mediterranean Sea.

Backpedaling from previously hardline statements on Islam, President Trump refers to Islam as “one of the world’s great faiths” calling for “tolerance and respect for each other.” He implored Muslim leaders to fight against radical Islam, which he portrayed as a “…a battle between good and evil.”

After visiting Saudi Arabia, Trump meets with Netanyahu where both assert joint views on the peace process, Iran, regional cooperation, and the long-standing relationship between Israel and the US; Trumps second meeting with Netanyahu since taking office.

President Trump’s proclamation to “officially recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel” breaks precedent. In doing so, he incurs bipartisan support in the US congress, but a flurry of criticism from analysts, diplomats and foreign leaders. In his remarks, Trump rebukes claims that he disqualified the US as a “reliable mediator” in future Palestinian-Israeli negotiations.

Vice President Pence firmly expresses American commitments to Israel’s security and commitment to the Arab-Israeli peace process. Palestinian Authority President Abbas and other Arab officials loudly criticize the speech and refuse to meet with Pence during his Middle East visit because of earlier US promise to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital.

Responding to PA President Abbas’ speech at the U.N. and the PA’s rejection of the U.S. as a legitimate participant in Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, Ambassador Haley clarifies American positions on Jerusalem and the negotiating process.

With reams of evidence secured by Israeli intelligence, the PM calls out Iran for lying about their nuclear activities both before and since signing the 2015 JCPOA nuclear agreement with six countries.

Novelist Amos Oz's final speech provides a summation of a lifetime of insights into Israeli society and a vision for what Zionism has yet to accomplish.

The most recent of Israel's Basic Laws, the statutes enacted in place of a formal constitution, controversially asserts the Jewish nature of the state, even though almost a quarter of its citizens are not Jewish.

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo delivers a more muscular vision of the U.S. presence in the Middle East than President Barack Obama offered in the same Cairo venue 10 years earlier.

A former IDF general, Benny Gantz officially launches his campaign to replace Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the April 2019 election. With pride of ownership, Gantz speaks of his love of Zionism, the Jewish people and the State of Israel and cites his 38-year military career.

U.S. President Donald Trump recognizes Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights more than 37 years after Israel annexed the mountains.

The plan builds on previous proposals for a two-state solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and contains a US-Israeli agreement that sets forth final borders for two states. The plan contains multiple prerequisites for Palestinian behavior before either the US or Israel might agree to Palestinian statehood as well as a proposed $50 economic development package to be allotted over a decade.

U.S. Ambassador to Israel David Friedman provides the most detailed Trump administration analyses of the prescribed two-state solution for terminating the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Israel's Likud and Blue and White parties agree to a three-year national unity coalition government with a rotation of prime ministers (Netanyahu and Gantz) to take place after 18 months. The COVID-19 pandemic, earlier paralysis in coalition formation and President Rivlin's urging catalyze the coalition agreement.

President Trump announces the diplomatic breakthrough under which Israel halts its plans to annex parts of the West Bank and the United Arab Emirates agrees to full diplomatic relations with Israel without any Israeli land concesssions.

Quietly pursued in the past, long-standing strategic ties between Israel and Gulf states have become public. Building on the historic Joint Agreement signed between Israel and the UAE in August 2020, the Abraham Accords serve as a framework for normalizing diplomatic relations between Israel, the UAE and Bahrain.

Yahya Sinwar, the Hamas leader in Gaza and mastermind of the October 7 attack, repeatedly expressed his desire to destroy Israel and his gratitude for Iran's support.

Fifteen of President Isaac Herzog’s speeches and interviews from 2016 to 2021 show his desire for tighter ties between Israel and the Diaspora.

Prime Minister Naftali Bennett outlines and offers details for meeting domestic and foreign policy challenges facing Israel. He asks all the citizens of Israel to forge together under the banners of realism and practical solutions.

Affirming Israel's strong relationship with the U.S. and normalized relations with six Arab states, Naftali Bennett castigates Iran for its support of toxic regional insurgencies and promises to prevent it from obtaining a nuclear weapon. He makes no mention of the Palestinian issue.

Yair Lapid, the leader of the Yesh Atid party, graciously thanks his predecessor, Naftali Bennett, for his service. As prime minister at least until a month or so after the scheduled November 1 Knesset election, Lapid emphasizes the value of Israel’s inclusive democratic principles. He affirms a commitment to keep Israel a majority-Jewish state and maintain support for a strong economy. While stressing Israel’s security and defense needs, including those from “Gaza to Iran,” he speaks with hope of solidifying Israel’s regional security presence based on the 2020 Abraham Accords.

On President Joe Biden’s trip to Israel, he and Prime Minister Yair Lapid affirmed the long-term U.S.-Israel strategic relationship.

The focus of Prime Minister Yair Lapid’s first speech at the UN was a political weather report of Israel’s relations with Arab neighbors. He lauded Arab states for embracing Israel, hoped that Israel could move toward a two-state solution with the Palestinians, and blistered the hate spewing from Hamas and Iran; Israel he said, would not tolerate Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon.

President Isaac Herzog visited Manama, Bahrain, his fourth trip to a Middle Eastern country in 2022 (Abu Dhabi in January, Istanbul in March, Amman in June and Sharm el-Sheikh in November), all aimed at bolstering bilateral relations with Arab states. Talks in Bahrain focused on expanding trade and sharing, among others, Israeli solar and desalination technologies.

After Israeli Attorney General Gali Baharav-Miara met with newly elected Justice Minister Yariv Levin about the Netanyahu government’s proposal to overhaul the judicial system, the attorney general crisply and cogently offers her opposition to that proposal.

Amid the massive public protest of the Netanyahu government's suggested changes to the judicial system, former Israeli Supreme Court judges join the attorney general in expressing opposition to the government proposals and call for a committee to review the judiciary and suggest a balanced plan for changes.

In a rare address to the nation, President Herzog calls for deliberate compromise in the wake of the Netanyahu government's proposed massive overhaul of the judicial system. The overhaul generated the largest public outpouring of opposition to a proposed government policy since Israel considered accepting German reparations in 1951-52.

After his urging compromise on the proposed judicial overhaul, President Isaac Herzog, in the starkest of terms, says Israel is approaching the “abyss of a civil war” as opponents and proponents head toward a showdown. He characterizes the proposed overhaul as “wrong, oppressive, and undermines our democratic foundations.”

President Herzog offers a compromise to the coalition's proposed judicial overhaul in the forms of enacting a new Basic Law, and writing amendments to existing Basic Laws. Its detail suggests considerable behind the scenes discussion, and if only portions are enacted upon, this document could be seen in the future as a benchmark in Israel's "constitutional" history.

Citing deep disaffection among elements of Israeli military reserve units and expressing those concerns to Prime Minister Netanyahu privately, Defense Minister Gallant makes his opinion public, causing Netanyahu to fire him, resulting in hundreds of thousand of Israelis in the streets. Two days after Gallant's speech, Netanyahu calls for a pause in pushing forward the judicial overhaul legislation.

Prime Minister Netanyahu offers two speeches to the nation within four days, first emphatically pushing ahead with the judicial overhaul process, then calling for a pause.

In just under an hour, Herzog emphasized the special US-Israeli relationship, citing common values between the two democracies, noting, "when the US is strong, Israel is stronger. And when Israel is strong, the US is more secure." He cited Israel's domestic and foreign policy challenges in its 75th year.

Addressing Israel's fear of Iran's access to nuclear weapons, the same point made by his predecessor Yair Lapid stressed in 2022 at the UN, Netanyahu like Lapid praised the Abraham Accords, noting in a quite unrestrained fashion that Israel was on the 'cusp of a historic peace with Saudi Arabia." The Prime Minister did mention support for a two-state solution with the Palestinians as Lapid had done previously.

After the horrific Hamas attack on Israel, President Joe Biden unequivocally categorizes Hamas’ brutality as "pure, unadulterated evil" and reiterates that the U.S. will “stand with Israel.”

Former US President Jimmy Carter embraced Hamas as a legitimate voice of the Palestinian people. His motivations possibly stretched from intentional to misguided to malevolent. Hamas leaders who were engaged in inter-Palestinian struggles remained pleased with the recognition he gave them. American officials and Israelis were keenly perturbed by the courtship he gave them.

President Biden reaffirmed the iron-clad US commitment to Israel's security and to eradicate the murderous nihilism of Hamas. He advocated for two states for two peoples; he committed his administration to facilitate that outcome.

Israeli Prime minister provides minimal detail for the Gaza Strip's post war civilian restructuring, focusing entirely on immediate and long term Israeli security needs with no imposed Palestinian state nor international negotiating intervention acceptable.

In presenting four obstacles in the way of ending the Hamas-Israel war, Sen. Chuck Schumer omits six basic obstacles that remain in the negotiating pathway to end the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

The inquiry team determined that the IDF failed in its mission to protect the residents of Kibbutz Be'eri; the bravery of the Be'eri residents and the members of the kibbutz's civilian rapid response team are commended for preventing the attack from spreading.  In the October 7, 2024 Hamas attack on the kibbutz, 101 civilians were killed, and 30 hostages from Kibbutz Be’eri and two additional hostages were abducted and taken into Gaza.

In a 52 minute speech, Netanyahu explained Israel’s absolute need for total victory in the Gaza war because Hamas and Iran were both enemies of the United States and Israel. With bi-partisan emphasis, he thanked Presidents Biden and Trump for their unwavering current and past support. Dozens of congressional members did not attend his speech, noting disagreements with the Prime Minister's policies.

Netanyahu’s speech reflected on the needed elimination of Hezbollah as an enemy of Israel, a powerful militia fighting in Lebanon against Israel for four decades. On the day of Netanyahu's speech, the Israeli Air Force killed Hassan Nasrallah, the Hezbollah leader in his Beirut offices along with other Hezbollah officials.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei delivers a synopsis of Iran’s hatred of Israel and the United States, provides deep insight into his unwavering commitment to destroying Israel, and mourns for slain Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah.

The details of the three-stage Hamas-Israel cease-fire that went into effect January 19, 2025, along with unanswered questions, insightful analyses and the relevant U.N. resolution from June 2024.

Amid a ceasefire in Gaza, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu becomes the first foreign leader to visit the White House during the second Trump administration, and President Donald Trump uses the occasion to declare his intention to take over and redevelop Gaza.

Abdullah II remains studiously noncommittal in support of Donald Trump's idea for the U.S. to take over the Gaza Strip, rebuild it and relocate its Palestinian residents to other countries. With Jordan's strong economic, strategic and defense ties to Washington, no one expected the king to be effusive for Trump's suggestions for Gaza's future. Jordan lacks the economic and demographic absorptive capacities and the political interest to take another wave of Palestinians into its territory.

Meeting in Cairo in early March 2025, the Arab League of States endorsed an Egyptian plan for the reconstruction of Gaza that was, above all else, a cleverly worded statement. The contents did not break new diplomatic ground and made no mention of Hamas or its political future. As a consensus document, it aimed at satisfying as many Arab interests and foreign ears as possible.

Benjamin Netanyahu makes his second White House visit of Donald Trump's second term, but the discussion this time expands beyond Gaza and regional peace to include bilateral trade after a Trump announcement of new tariffs on Israeli goods.

Visiting Qatar after Saudi Arabia and before the United Arab Emirates in a Middle East trip that excluded Israel, President Donald Trump praises and pledges to defend Qatar and indicates a deal on Iran's nuclear program is close.

PA President Abbas makes requests and gives promises to the French president for the establishment of a Palestinian state. His commitments were not negotiated with Israel. They are meant to seek support for the end of the Gaza war, the affirmation of Abbas and the PA as the sole Palestinian political address, and international support for a Palestinian state. As in the past, the PA and Abbas seek international support to pressure Israel into undesirable political actions.

Speaking in English, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announces Israel's airstrikes on Iran, targeting nuclear enrichment, nuclear weaponization, nuclear scientists, the Natanz nuclear facility and ballistic missile infrastructure. Netanyahu says the attack is for the world, not just for Israel.

President Trump announces precision U.S. airstrikes on Iran's key nuclear sites, citing Iran's four-decade-long hatred of the U.S. and killing of Americans and others. He thanks the U.S. military, the Israeli military and Prime Minister Netanyahu, warning Iran to pursue peace because more targets remain.

Before a White House dinner, President Trump and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu talk about Gaza, Iran, Syria and Middle East peace.

Seized by the severity of the Gaza war and nonmovement on a Palestinian-Israeli negotiating process, the U.N. offers a diplomatic road map to end the war and start negotiations. Led by France and Saudi Arabia, it asserts PA primacy as the legitimate Palestinian political representative, addresses possible Palestinian governance reform, seeks to empower a sovereign and economically viable state of Palestine living side by side in security with Israel, and contains other vague PA promises. Israel and the U.S. reject the Declaration. The Israeli government refuses to have outside parties determine the outlines or pace of negotiations with any country because negotiations impact Israeli security today and tomorrow.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio's visit to Israel was primarily prompted by American criticism of Israel’s airstrike on September 9, targeting Hamas leaders in Doha, the Qatari capital. Rubio arrived in Doha at the end of an emergency Arab-Islamic leaders summit that roundly condemned Israel’s attack. In Doha, he affirmed US interests in Qatar, with particular knowledge that it hosts America's largest air base in the Middle East and the forward headquarters for the US Central Command. The US was seeking to balance its relationship with Israel and Qatar.

President Macron’s speech links the end of Hamas-Israeli conflict to the evolution of a of two-state solution. He acknowledges that Israel has the power to end the war and evolve a Palestinian state, asserting that if Israel does neither to the satisfaction of France and her European partners, Israel could pay an undisclosed price. He offers no such penalties to be placed on the PA for its failure to meet its commitments. Once again the Palestinian Arab national movement uses the international community to pressure Israel into concessions. On the same day, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu emphatically rejects the establishment of a Palestinian state west of the Jordan River. The Israeli parliament in June 2004 rejected any unilateral recognition of a Palestinian state by a 68-9 vote.

A comprehensive U.S. plan to end the Hamas-Israel war is unveiled eight days before the second anniversary of the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack.

President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu explain their expansive vision for a peaceful Middle East through the implementation of a 20-point U.S. plan to end the Gaza war with the support of many Arab and Muslim countries.

President Trump issued a presidential order placing Qatar under the military protection of the United States. He did not submit his policy for U.S. Senate ratification, as would be necessary for the staying power of a treaty. The U.S. had never offered such protection to an Arab country, let alone one that sits across the Persian Gulf from Iran. The action was viewed as a direct response to Israel’s intrusion into Qatar’s sovereignty three weeks earlier in a failed attack on Hamas leaders in Doha. But the order might have been a step toward including Qatar in the Abraham Accords. And Qatar is potentially a key funder in rebuilding the Gaza Strip.

Amid praise for the end of the war in Gaza and hopes for long-term peace, humanitarian aid and freed hostages, world leaders barely acknowledge Hamas exists, let alone that it bears any responsibility for the status of the Strip.

In a Knesset speech, Prime Minister Netanyahu delivers effusive praise for President Trump’s Middle East peacemaking even though the U.S. plan appears to have put the support of key Muslim powers in the region ahead of sign-on from Israeli or Palestinian officials.

The U.S., Turkey, Qatar and Egypt commit to trying to implement President Trump's vision for enduring peace in Gaza and the entire Middle East without offering details or obtaining the sign-on of Israeli or Palestinian officials.

Opposition leader Yair Lapid, addressing the Knesset, praises Donald Trump for brokering the Gaza peace plan, calls on his fellow Israelis to renew their values-based democracy, and warns Israel's enemies in the Middle East and beyond that the Jewish state is here to stay.

Donald Trump takes a victory lap and lays out short- and long-term visions for Gaza, Israel and the Middle East while becoming the fourth U.S. president to address the Knesset.

U.S. Middle East envoys Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff express confidence in a "60 Minutes" interview that the Trump peace plan will succeed in Gaza after two years of the Hamas-Israel war.

Visiting Israel, U.S. Vice President JD Vance expresses optimism about the rocky Hamas-Israel ceasefire and broader hopes for Middle East peace while refusing to set deadlines for Hamas to disarm or return all hostage bodies.

The CENTCOM head demonstrates the strong U.S.-Israeli relationship in his eulogy for Omer Neutra, an Israeli-American soldier whose body was held in Gaza for two years.

The U.N. Security Council voted 13-0 on November 17, 2025, to adopt Resolution 2803, endorsing the 20-point Trump peace plan to end the Hamas-Israel war. The precedent-setting resolution provides a pathway to stability in the Gaza Strip and offers a chance for less violence in the Palestinian-Israeli relationship.

Prince Mohammed bin Salman and President Donald Trump continued a decades-long process of strengthening Saudi-U.S. ties during a White House meeting that put Saudi security and investment ahead of the Abraham Accords.

Supreme Court President Yitzhak Amit warns about the danger to the Israeli public and democracy of sustained political attacks on the judiciary and individual judges.

Former Supreme Court President Aharon Barak makes the case against the Netanyahu government's efforts to overhaul the judiciary, arguing that Israeli democracy requires judicial independence and protection for minority rights.

Chancellor Merz's visit coincides with Germany signing the largest Israeli military arms export agreement, covering the Arrow 3, and his support of a two-state solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Netanyahu recalls centuries of efforts to annihilate Jews, including those in Germany and by Hamas, and says Israel will not give up military control of West Bank land.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio explains the urgent need to establish the Board of Peace and the International Stabilization Force for Gaza to move from Phase 1 to Phase 2 in the ceasefire, but he also warns that the work likely will last longer than the Trump administration.

In their fifth U.S. meeting of 2025, President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu show unity on Gaza, Hamas, Iran and their mutual appreciation for each other but offer glimpses of differences on Turkey, Syria and the West Bank.

The Trump administration’s proposed charter for the Board of Peace, the body the United Nations has charged with overseeing the Gaza ceasefire, does not mention Gaza or any other specific location of operation but does grant its chairman, Donald Trump, extensive control over its mission and operations.

While the Palestinian official leading the technocratic Gaza administration promises to open the Rafah Crossing and the Bulgarian high commissioner for Gaza urges the world to focus on the big picture, U.S. envoy Jared Kushner lays out a vision for Gaza as a rapid, phased real estate redevelopment.